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The European Commission proposed on late 2017 that the European Stability Mechanism would be transferred into the EU legal framework. The transfer would establish a new European agency, the European Monetary Fund (EMF). The Commission proposes that the establishment of the EMF could be based on article 352 TFEU, which is often referred to as the flexibility clause. Under article 352 TFEU the EU can take measures if they are necessary to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties and within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, even when the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers. The application of the flexibility clause would establish the EMF through secondary legislation without a Treaty amendment. However, it is not straightforward that the flexibility clause is a proper legal basis for the establishment. This thesis explores whether the EMF can be established through applying article 352 TFEU. The thesis evaluates whether the application of the flexibility clause is possible both in the EU law perspective and the Member States’ perspective. The study 
analyses the Commission’s proposal alongside with the different arguments favouring or opposing the application of the flexibility clause in the issue.  
According to the thesis, the application of the flexibility clause for the establishment of the EMF is problematic. The study finds that the principle of conferral and the limited competence in the field of economic policy may oppose the establishment of the EMF through applying the flexibility clause. As the EU can only act within the competence that the Member States have attributed to it and the competence is limited in the field of economic policy to Member States coordinating their economic policies, it is not straightforward that the EU has competence to establish EMF through applying the flexibility clause. Also, according to the thesis, the establishment of the EMF may not fulfil the conditions laid in the flexibility clause. It is required, among others, that the measure must be within the framework of the policies of the EU and the measure must be necessary to attain one of the objectives set by the Treaties. It is not straightforward that the establishment of the EMF fulfils these conditions as the status of the financial stability, which is the objective of the EMF, as EU’s objective is not evident and the framework of economic policies is limited. Also, the study claims that the establishment of the EMF through application of the flexibility clause may be in breach of the constitutional laws of Member States. According to the study, it appears that the application of the flexibility clause in the establishment of the EMF is not problem-free. At the time of writing, the legislative process remains open. 
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Euroopan komissio ehdotti loppuvuodesta 2017 Euroopan vakausmekanismin siirtämistä EU:n oikeudelliseen kehikkoon uutena EU:n virastona, jonka nimi olisi Euroopan valuuttarahasto (EMF). Komissio ehdotti, että EMF:n oikeusperustana olisi Euroopan Unionin toiminnasta tehdyn sopimuksen (SEUT) 352 artikla, jota usein kutsutaan joustavuuslausekkeeksi. Tämä artikla mahdollistaa sen, että EU voi hyväksyä toimenpiteen, joka kuuluu perussopimuksissa määriteltyihin politiikan aloihin, silloin kun se on välttämätön perussopimuksissa asetettujen tavoitteiden saavuttamiseksi silloin, kun perussopimuksissa ei erikseen ole määräyksiä tarvittavista valtuuksista. Joustavuuslauseketta käyttämällä perustettu EMF olisi EU:n sekundaarilainsäädännön alainen, eikä perustamisen yhteydessä muutettaisi perussopimuksia. Ei ole kuitenkaan selvää, voiko joustavuuslauseke olla riittävä oikeusperusta EMF:n perustamiselle. Tämä tutkielma perehtyy siihen, voidaanko EMF perustaa soveltamalla SEUT:n 352 artiklaa. Tutkielmassa lähestytään asiaa niin EU-oikeuden kuin jäsenvaltioidenkin oikeuden kannalta. Tutkielmassa analysoidaan komission ehdotusta rinnakkain joustavuuslausekkeen käyttöä tukevien ja vastustavien seikkojen kanssa. 
Tutkielmassa tullaan siihen lopputulokseen, että joustavuuslausekkeen käyttämiseen EMF:n oikeusperustana liittyy ongelmia. Tutkielman mukaan annetun toimivallan periaate ja EU:n toimivallan rajoitukset talouspolitiikan alueella saattavat olla ristiriidassa EMF:n perustamisen kanssa silloin, kun perustamiseen käytetään joustavuuslauseketta. EU voi toimia ainoastaan sen toimivallan puitteissa, jonka jäsenvaltiot ovat sille antaneet. Annettu toimivalta on talouspolitiikan alueella rajoitettu siihen, että jäsenvaltiot koordinoivat talouspolitiikkansa itse. Tämän vuoksi ei ole selvää onko EU:lla toimivaltaa perustaa EMF:ia joustavuuslauseketta käyttämällä. Tutkielma nostaa esiin myös sen, että EMF:n perustaminen ei välttämättä täytä joustavuuslausekkeen soveltamiselle asetettuja ehtoja. Näiden ehtojen mukaan soveltamisen täytyy muun muassa kuulua EU:n määriteltyjen politiikkojen alle ja sen täytyy olla välttämätön EU:n perussopimuksissa määriteltyjen tavoitteiden saavuttamiseksi. Ei ole selvää täyttääkö EMF:n perustaminen nämä ehdot. Ehtojen täyttyminen on epävarmaa, sillä taloudellisen vakauden, joka on EMF:n tavoite, asema EU:n tavoitteena ei ole selvä sekä EU:n toimintavaltuudet talouspolitiikan alueella ovat rajoitetut. Tutkielman mukaan on myös mahdollista, että EMF:n perustaminen joustavuuslauseketta käyttämällä rikkoo jäsenvaltioiden perustuslakeja. Näiden seikkojen vuoksi tutkielmassa tullaan siihen lopputulokseen, että joustavuuslausekkeen käyttäminen EMF:n perustamisessa ei ole ongelmatonta. Tutkielman kirjoitushetkellä lainsäädäntöprosessi asiassa on yhä kesken. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 The general background 
If the Union wants to act, the Union needs to have competence to act. The European 
Commission proposed on the 6th of December 2017 that the EU should establish the European 
Monetary Fund (EMF) through applying article 352 Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).1 Article 352 TFEU, often referred as the flexibility clause, can provide a legal 
basis for a Union actions even when the Treaties, TFEU and Treaty on the European Union 
(TEU), have not provided the necessary powers. 
The EMF would, if it is established, be a Union agency and an emergency financial assistance 
system mobilizing funding and providing stability support through various instruments.2 The 
current financial assistance system is intergovernmental between the euro area Member States. 
The proposal suggests transfer of the current institution into the EU legal framework. The 
deeper integration in the field of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been on the 
political discussion for many years. The Union authorities have been in favor of the deepening 
of the EMU3 and the authorities have made concrete initiatives.4 The Commission’s proposal 
represents EU’s ambition go further with the integration in the EMU. 
The EMF would be the next instrument in the chain of instruments after the financial crisis. 
These instruments have aimed to protect the financial stability of the euro area by providing 
financial assistance. The instruments have varied within and outside the Union legal framework. 
                                                 
1 The European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary 
Fund’, COM/2017/0827 final, 2017/0333 (APP), 6 December 2017. 
2 The proposed instruments are stability support to EMF Members, EMF precautionary financial assistance, financial assistance for the re-capitalization of credit institutions of an EMF Member, EMF loans, Primary market support facility, Secondary market support facility and Instrument for the direct re-capitalization of credit institutions. The European Commission, (n 1), Articles 13 – 19 of the Annex. 
3 See, e.g. Jean-Claude Juncker and others, ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’, (Five 
Presidents’ Report), (2015); the European Commission, ‘Reflection paper on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union, COM(2017) 291, (2017); the European Commission, ‘Deepening Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union – Commission Note ahead of the European Council and the Euro Summit of 28 – 29 June 2018 < https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/euco-emu-booklet-june2018_en.pdf> accessed 19 February 2019. 
4 The European Commission, ‘Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on completing the Banking Union, COM (2017) 592, 11 October 2017.  
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Some of them have been Union governed actions and others intergovernmental initiatives. The 
first instruments were bilateral case-by-case rescue programmes. The regime has evolved 
towards more structured programs and more structured instruments. The current instrument, the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), is established outside the Union framework. The 
Commission’s proposal, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Establishment of the 
European Monetary Fund, would evolve and replace the ESM. 
The establishment of the EMF through applying the flexibility clause begs the question of the 
Union’s competence to take the action. The notion of competence refers to the Union’s 
jurisdiction, which refers to the scope of action, and the power, which refers to the means and 
the instruments of the action.5 The Union competence is governed by the principle of conferral. 
Under the principle, the Union can only act within the limits of the powers conferred to it by 
Member States in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) or in the TFEU) (together the 
Treaties).6 The Treaties do not explicitly state that the Union would have competence to 
establish EMF. However, the principle of conferral leaves some room for discretion. Article 
352 TFEU, the flexibility clause, allows the Union to take measures if they are necessary to 
attain one of the objectives of the TEU or TFEU even when the Treaties do not provide such 
powers. 
The scope of application of the flexibility clause is limited. The flexibility clause itself sets 
three conditions for the application. The first condition is that there is no specific legal basis in 
the Treaties for the measure. The second condition is that the action is within the framework of 
Union policies. The third condition is that the measure is necessary to attain one of the 
objectives set out in the Treaties.7 Before the establishment of the EMF, it must be examined 
whether these conditions are met. Furthermore, the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
                                                 
5 The notion of power can be determined, also, by division of three defining features. In this determination, the allocation of the powers refers to who exercise the powers, the exercise of the powers relates to how the powers are used. The scope of a given power is categorized in three categories. This categorization of competence is introduced in Chapter 3.1.3. On the notion of power, see e.g. Lena Boucon, ‘EU Law and retained Powers of 
Member States’, 170. In Azoulai L (ed), The Question of Competence in the European Union (2014) Oxford University Press; Loïc Azoulai (2014) Introduction: The Question of Competence, 2. In ‘The Question of 
Competence in the European Union’ edited by Loïc Azoulai (22014) Oxford University Press. 
6 Article 5(2) TFEU. 
7 Article 352(1) TFEU.  
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European Union8 is important when considering the interpretation of the flexibility clause. 
According to the Court, the flexibility clause cannot be used for widening the scope of the 
Union powers beyond the general framework. The general framework is set on the Treaty 
provisions and especially on the provisions defining the tasks and the activities of the Union. 
The Court stated that the flexibility clause cannot be used to amend the Treaties without 
following the procedure set for amendments.9 Therefore, it is important to study whether the 
establishment of the EMF would widen the scope in such a way the Court rejected. It must be 
studied whether the conditions for the use of the flexibility clause are met. Accordingly, it must 
be studied whether the EU has competence to establish the EMF in the form now proposed. 
A study concerning the Union competence to establish the EMF through applying the flexibility 
clause is needed, because the competence in the issue is vague. There is no direct, authoritative 
answer available. Also, the studies related often concern the ESM, not the possible Union 
agency. The Commission’s recourse to the flexibility clause has been rare and therefore, the 
boundaries of the flexibility clause’s applicability needs to be examined. Also, the 
establishment of the EMF seems to have significance as the current mechanism concern 
remarkable liabilities and notable economic importance. Accordingly, it seems important to 
evaluate whether the action can be taken. 
Also, the importance of the study concerning the establishment of the EMF through applying 
the flexibility clause relates to the need to protect the Treaty revision procedure. As the 
flexibility clause can be used to establish secondary legislation and not to amend the Treaties, 
the study about the issue is important. The secondary legislation does not require the ratification 
of the Member States. In some Member States, a Treaty amendment requires referendum. As 
the Treaty revision procedure is long and difficult, it is understandable that the Commission 
wants to avoid it. However, as Treaty amendments may change the structure and functioning 
of the Union, the Treaty amendment procedure should be protected. Therefore, the 
Commission’s proposal, as it suggests significant changes, should be evaluated carefully. The 
flexibility clause cannot be used as the circumvention of the Treaty revision procedure. If the 
                                                 
8 The Court of Justice of the European Union is referred as the Court, except when there is possibility of confusion with national courts. When this occurs, the Court is referred by the abbreviation CJEU. 
9 Opinion of 28 March 1996, Opinion 2/94, C-2/94, EU:C:1996:140, paragraph 30. 
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Union does not have competence to establish EMF through applying the flexibility clause, the 
EMF can be established through a Treaty amendment. 
The Commission gave the Proposal in December 2017. Despite the prolonged time and the lack 
of actions taken, the establishment of the EMF is a timely topic. The Commission has planned 
that decisions on the matter would be taken in the mid-2019. The Commission has stated in the 
summer of 2018 that it is important to ensure the future incorporation of the ESM into EU law.10 
Also, there have been recent statements in the issue. For example, a candidate for the 
Commission’s next president, Manfred Weber, has stated that the establishment of the EMF is 
a top priority to him.11 The statement implies that the topic will be, most likely, under 
discussions in the near future. 
1.2 The research question 
The subject of the research focuses on the Union competence to establish EMF. It concentrates 
on the question of the suitability of the flexibility clause in the matter. The research question is 
as follows: 
Can Article 352 Treaty of the functioning of the European Union serve as 
legal basis for the establishment of the European Monetary Fund?  
The question requires yes or no as answer because a legal basis cannot be partly applicable. 
Although the answer cannot include middle ground, the question must be examined broadly 
and requires research and analysis. In order answer to the research question, a set of more 
specific aspects need to be assessed. The sub-questions in the thesis are as follows: How the 
notion of competence is understood in the Union constitution? Does the establishment of the 
EMF fulfil the conditions set to the application of the flexibility clause? How the national 
constitutions of Member States’ take a view of the Union competence in the matter? Answers 
to these questions are crucial to the answer to the research question. 
                                                 
10 The European Commission, ‘Deepening Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union – Commission Note ahead of the European Council and the Euro Summit of 28 – 29 June 2018 < https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/euco-emu-booklet-june2018_en.pdf> accessed 19 February 2019. 
11 Michelle Martin, ‘Germany’s Weber: Creating European Monetary Fund should be a priority’, Reuters (2018) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-election-weber/germanys-weber-creating-european-monetary-fund-should-be-a-priority-idUSKCN1NO1M5 accessed 31 January 2019.  
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The subject of the study is the legal basis for the EMF and the political considerations are 
limited out of the study. Political considerations include the political opinions and evaluation 
of the political need for the EMF. Also, the political evaluation of the monetary and economic 
union (EMU) are excluded out of the study. The political opinions can easily be represented as 
legal.12 The answer to the research question has large political impacts. The competence in the 
context of the establishment of the EMF may influence the political actions of Member States. 
However, the different aspects are tried to represent as widely as possible and the risk of 
political opinions is perceived and opted out as much as possible. 
The main source of the study is the Commission’s proposal. The proposal is studied alongside 
the constitutional material of the EU. As main actors in the European Constitution the Treaties 
and the Court provide the most important sources.13 It is worth noticing that the Court’s case 
law is integral part of the EU legal system. The case law of the Court is equal constitutional 
source with the Treaties. The Court has played an important role in monitoring the division of 
competence.14 The Court’s most significant case law related to the issue is the Pringle case15 
and the opinion 2/9416. The constitutions of Member States are the sources of the Member 
States’ views in the issue. The constitutional actors of the Member States, such as constitutional 
courts, are referred to as sources of national constitutions. Other references used include 
academic studies and publications of the EU authorities. 
1.3 Analytical framework of the study 
This sub-chapter examines the theoretical approach of the thesis. The methodology applied in 
the thesis is mainly constitutionalism.17 However, as the thesis includes also other theoretical 
                                                 
12 Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, ‘EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials’ (2015), 76.  
13 More about the constitutional actors in the context of the EU constitution in Kaarlo Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2015) 133.  
14 Ronald van Ooik, The European Court of Justice and the Division of Competence in the European Union (2007) 13. 
15 Judgement of 27 November 2012, Pringle, C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756. 
16 Opinion 2/94 (n 11). 
17 Some commentators have claimed that the EU legal studies do not need its own analytical approaches as the regular sub-disciplines in law are relevant. However, the EU legal studies regularly apply constitutionalism as methodology. Some commentators have seen that the EU legal studies, as autonomous legal system that has a special nature, has, also, other methodologies than constitutionalism. These methodologies include, for example, new governance, institutionalism and constructivism. See, e.g. Karl Riesenhuber, European Legal Methodology,  
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approaches, the approach is often inter-disciplinary. Methodology, the theoretical framework 
and the systemic procedure of the thesis, is applied in the thesis in order to answer the research 
question.18 The examination of meta-theory places the thesis in the wider theoretical context of 
the EU legal studies, the EU constitutional studies, the Member States’ constitutional studies 
and studies concerning law and economics in both the EU and Member States. This sub-chapter 
examines the theoretical approach of the thesis by examining the literature of the meta-theory 
about the EU law and especially about the constitutionalism. Also, other theoretical aspects that 
related to the research subject are briefly examined. These aspects include two sub-disciplines 
of law, legal dogmatics and law and economy. In addition, this sub-chapter examines the 
methods used in the thesis. The main method used in the thesis can be described as 
argumentative context analysis: the study examines the research question through analyzing the 
EU legal system. This method is accompanied with different methods for the interpretation of 
law, such as systemic, linguistic and teleological interpretation. 
A closer look into the meta-theory of the EU legal studies reveals that the EU legal studies are 
not a homogenous field. Nevertheless, the commentators have mostly agreed on the idea of 
inter-disciplinary and contextual approach of the EU legal studies.19 These features are included 
in the thesis as well. The application of multiple methodologies, both regular sub-disciplines 
and constitutionalism, implies the inter-disciplinary nature of the study. In the thesis, the 
contextual approach appears in several ways. The context has an emphasized role in the 
approach to the research problem. The pronounced role of the principles and objectives in the 
EU law underlines the context-based approach of the EU legal studies. In the thesis, this is 
implied, for example, through the important role of the principle of conferral. Also, the 
objectives of the Union have an emphasized role in the research problem. In addition, the EU 
                                                 
(Intersentia, 2017); Simon Bulmer, ‘Institutional and Policy Analysis in the European Union: From the Treaty of 
Rome to the Present’ in David Phinnemore and Alex Warleigh-Lack (eds), Reflections on European Integration: 50 Years of the Treaty of Rome (2009) 118; Robert Cryer and others, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart 2011) 20. 
18 Methodology is the systematic procedure that a scholar applies. See, Cryer and others (n 17) 7.  
19 Hunt and Shaw include critical approach to the nature of EU legal studies. However, the thesis is not, mostly, critical. The thesis does not apply the traditional critical methodologies, such as the critical theory, the critical legal studies or the poststructuralism. According to Hunt and Shaw the idea has been first represented by Francis Snyder 
in 1990’s. Jo Hunt and Jo Shaw, ‘Fairy Tale of Luxembourg? Reflections on Law and Legal Scholarship in 
European Integration’ in David Phinnemore and Alex Warleigh-Lack (eds), Reflections on European Integration: 50 Years of the Treaty of Rome (2009) 97. See also, Neil Walker, ‘EU Constitutionalism in the State Constitutional 
Tradition’ (2006) 21, 583.  
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legal studies have been described being reactive and based on events.20 This is due to the 
evolving nature of the EU polity.21 The thesis reflects this tradition of EU legal studies. The 
study reacts to the Commission’s proposal. The event that the thesis studies is the possible 
establishment of the EMF.  
The EU legal studies have often structured the EU legal order through doctrines. The doctrinal 
approach has been the most common through the integration.22 However, recently the pluralist 
approach has been highlighted.23 In the thesis, the both trends have been taken into 
consideration. On the one hand, the question whether the establishment of the EMF fulfils the 
conditions of the flexibility clause represents the doctrinal approach. On the other hand, the 
national constitutions provide pluralist perspective.  
The scope of the EU legal studies is extensive. The EU constitutional order is only one piece of 
the EU legal studies.24 The Union competence is considered as one of the most important 
research subjects of the EU constitutional studies.25 Constitutionalism, as a methodology, is 
interested in the constitutional translation from Member States to the Union.26 The 
constitutionalism seeks to explain interfaces between constitutional doctrine and institutions 
and, also, the broader socio-political dynamics of the EU.27 Notably, the EU law is not separate 
and distinct from the legal orders of Member States and the same theoretical tools can be 
applied.28 At the same time, the special characteristics of the Union require the translation of 
the concepts of national constitutions. The constitutionalism as a methodology has attracted, 
however, direct criticism. The critics have seen it only being the terrain of study.29 The criticism 
                                                 
20 Neil Walker, ‘Legal Theory and the European Union: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 581, 583. 
21 Hunt and Shaw (n 19).  
22 ibid, 97. 
23 ibid, 107. 
24 ibid, 96. 
25 Azoulai (n 6) 1. 
26 Cryer and others (n 17) 51. 
27 Bulmer (n 21) 121. 
28 Hunt and Shaw (n 19) 108. 
29 For example, Bulmer mentions that the constitutionalism can be criticised as being only a terrain of study. As for Walker, he claims that the constitutionalism can be understood as category-error. If the constitutionalism is seen as a category-error, the word constitution in the Union context could be only imitation or nonsense due to the  
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is valid. However, it is not necessary to classify constitutionalism as methodology, it to be a 
useful approach in this study.   
The constitutionalism can be applied into three different tasks: The first task is to determine the 
boundaries of the Union competence. The second task is to examine the principles that govern 
the use of the competence. The third task is evaluating the division of powers.30 The thesis 
includes all three of these tasks. The issues are related and could not easily be separated from 
each other. The thesis seeks to determine the boundaries of the Union competence by analyzing 
the general constitutional framework of the Union, the arguments of the Commission in the 
Proposal and the Member States’ constitutions. The principles governing the use of 
competence, especially the principle of subsidiarity, are evaluated in the context of the 
establishment of the EMF. The question whether the CJEU or the national actors, such as 
constitutional courts, hold the power to determine the boundaries of the Union competence, 
implies the third task of determination of division of powers. However, the thesis emphasizes 
the determination of the boundaries of the Competence. 
The theoretical approach of the thesis has interconnections with the regular sub-disciplines of 
law. The regular sub-disciplines of law support the constitutionalism and they provide the base 
that the constitutionalism is built on. Thus, the application of constitutionalism does not exclude 
the use of the regular sub-disciplines of law. The thesis applies features from legal dogmatics 
and legal positivism. The legal dogmatics focuses on the analytical studies of law. It does not 
concentrate only on linguistic arguments, but also the contextual aspects.31 The thesis implies 
this by not only focusing on the wording of the Treaties, but also examining the context. The 
context focuses on the competence through the objectives of the EU on the one hand, and the 
competence through national constitutions on the other. In the thesis, as in the legal positivism, 
the law is valid when it has formal legal status. The legal positivism focuses on the description 
                                                 lack of political ambition. Other critics towards the constitutionalism in the Union context, as Walker states, include, on the one hand the ambiguity of the term and, on the other hand, the establishment of the term in the nation-state context. Walker explains that the meta-theoretical question of constitutionalism in the Union is not important due to the possibility to determine the concept all over again in different contexts. Then again, according to Walker, the national constitutional tradition can be understood as only relevant reference to the Union constitution. Bulmer (n 21) 121; Walker (n 20) 2 – 3. 
30 Azoulai (n 6) 1. 
31 Seppo Laakso, Lainopin teoreettiset lähtökohdat (2012) 510.  
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and explanation of the law as it is.32 Other than legal aspects, such as morality, are not taken 
into consideration.33 The thesis seeks to determine the purview of the flexibility clause in the 
context of the establishment of the EMF. Therefore, the thesis seeks to explain the valid law. 
The study is based on the systematization and interpretation of valid law. The thesis focuses on 
the valid law as it now stands.  
The thesis has, also, strong interconnections with the law and economics. This methodology is 
not applied directly in the thesis, but it is examined here due to the impact on the research 
subject. The law and economics explain the law by reference to economic analysis. It is based 
on the legal positivist approach to the law as the law is seen as regulated by active legislators 
and it studies the valid law as it is. The law and economics often seek to find the most effective 
way to legislate economic actors and apprising the law.34 The thesis, although, does not include 
such remarks. The connection between the research subject and the law and economics is, 
rather, shown in the thesis in the examination of the financial assistance mechanisms and the 
proposed regulation. The subject of the study needs the reflection of the economic thinking. 
The study has interest on the law and economics because of its discussion on the notion of the 
economic constitution. The notion has interconnections with the research subject. The notion 
of the economic constitution tries to combine the legal and economic scholarship at the deep, 
conceptual level.35 The German ordoliberal school introduced the notion in the 1960’s36, but it 
is not unanimously accepted.37 Unlike in the thesis, the ordoliberals connect the economic 
constitution with a specific economic model. The economic constitution has been used in the 
Union context as well. According to some commentators, the ordoliberal school promoted the 
free movement of goods, capital, services and labor.38 In the Union context, the notion refers 
today to interrelation between the constitutional law of the Union and economy. Because of the 
                                                 
32 Cryer and others (n 17) 38 
33 ibid, 37. 
34 Cryer and others (n 17). 
35 Kaarlo Tuori and Klaus Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis – A Constitutional analysis, (Cambridge University Press 2014), xi. 
36 Walker (n 20), 595 
37 Kaarlo Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2015), 127. 
38 Christian Joerges, The European Economic Constitution and Its Transformation Through the Financial Crisis  (2015) ZenTra Working Paper in Transnational Studies No. 47/2015.  
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multidimensional nature of the Union constitution, as some commentators have put it, the 
economic constitution refers to the economic dimension of the competence.39 According to 
these commentators, the economic provisions of the Treaties form a central piece of the 
economic constitution.40 The question of competence is highly interconnected with the 
economic constitution, too. The concept of the economic constitution is, therefore, an 
interesting theoretical background to the thesis.  
The methods used in the thesis are argumentative context analysis accompanied with different 
interpretation methods of the law. These interpretation methods are teleological, systemic and 
linguistic interpretation. Notably, the methods applied in the thesis include the methods of 
interpretation of the EU law and the constitutional law of the Member States as well. 
The thesis approaches the Union constitution in, at least, two ways. Firstly, the Union 
constitution is analysed through the form of application. This application is the establishment 
of the EMF. Secondly, the Union constitution is analysed through its interaction with the 
national constitutions of Member States.41 This is partly because the EU constitution relies on 
the support from Member State constitutions42 and the EU constitution cannot be taken out of 
this context. Accordingly, the interrelation between the constitutional law and its object of 
regulation, which is in the thesis the establishment of the EMF, is examined multi-
dimensionally.  
In the thesis, the constitutions of the Member States are illustrated through two examples, 
Finland and Germany. Finland is used as an example because of the thesis’ nature being a thesis 
of Finnish master’s degree. As for Germany, it has been used as an example because of the 
extensive case law related to the research question. However, the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States are all different, and the examples chosen reflects only two example 
constitutions. These examples represent quite similar jurisdictions. Clearly, the natures of these 
two constitutions have an effect on the findings in the thesis. Different examples could lead to 
                                                 
39 The economic constitution has been used in this sense also by Tuori and Tuori. See, Tuori and Tuori (n 45), xii. 
40 Éloi Laurent and Jacques Le Cacheux, ‘Integrity and Efficiency in the EU: The Case Against the European 
Economic Constitution’ (2006) 130. 
41 Tuori and Tuori (n 45), xii, 9; Tuori (n 13). xii – xiii. 
42 Tuori and Tuori (n 45), 9.  
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different conclusions. For example, Germany has taken a stricter stand on the Union 
competence issues than many other Member States.43 Therefore, using of other Member States 
as examples could lead into a conclusion that the Member States and the Union agree in the 
competence division issue. Accordingly, by using Germany as an example the issues related to 
the competence are more apparent.   
The thesis uses different interpretation methods for law. The interpretation of the Union law 
differs slightly from the interpretation of national laws. The linguistic interpretation is 
emphasized in the interpretation of the constitutions of the Member States. The thesis is mostly 
relied on the authoritative statements about the interpretation of the constitutions. These 
authorities are constitutional courts of Member States or other constitutional authorities, such 
as parliamentary committees. 
As for Union law, the systemic and the teleological interpretation is in more important role than 
the linguistic interpretation. Back at the 1960’s, the Court ruled that it interprets the Union law 
based on ‘the spirit, general scheme and wording’.44 Later on, the Court ruled that the 
interpretation involves comparing different language versions and placing Union provisions in 
its context. The Union law as a whole, including the objectives of the Union, must be 
considered.45 The Court has ruled that both teleological and linguistic interpretation are valid. 
The former interpretation method, in the Union context, refers to both purpose-oriented and 
contextual interpretation. The linguistic interpretation has strong interconnections with 
systemic interpretation, as the systemic understanding of the Union legal order, including the 
principles of the Union, is required in the EU law interpretation.46 In the question of the 
establishment of the EMF, the teleological interpretation underlines the relevance of the legal 
framework.  
In addition, linguistic interpretation is also applied in the thesis. The linguistic interpretation of 
the EU law has been under criticism. The Union has multiple official languages and, therefore, 
                                                 
43 Mikko Puumalainen, EU:n etusijaperiaatteesta Suomen valtiosäännössä (doctor, Turun yliopiston oikeustieteellinen tiedekunta 2018), 148. 
44 Judgement of the Court of 5 February 1963, Van Gend & Loos, 26-62, EU:C:1963:1, para 5. 
45 Judgement of the Court of 6 October 1982, CILFIT, C 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 18. 
46 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law: Judical Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional 
Pluralism’ (2008) 137 European Journal of Legal Studies, 140.  
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the linguistic equality requires that all language versions of the provisions are relevant. 
Problematically, linguistic interpretation easily concentrates on one language version.47 
However, the Court has constantly relied on linguistic interpretation, and, therefore, it cannot 
pass over. The multilingual nature of the Union should, in any case, take into account in the 
interpretation of the Union provisions. Considering the research question, the linguistic 
interpretation stands out when interpreting the Union competence and the flexibility clause. 
To sum up, the thesis applies constitutionalism, a special EU legal studies approach, as 
methodology. The constitutionalism is accompanied with the regular sub-disciplines of law. As 
examined in this sub-chapter, the finding a singular methodology for the research question is 
not an easy task – or even desired, as using a couple of methodologies helps to find answers to 
the question. Also, the thesis applies multiple methods in order answering the research question. 
These methods are argumentative context analysis and different interpretation methods of law. 
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. In the second chapter, the instruments aiming to stabilize 
are examined. The chapter illuminates the context of the proposed measure and instrument. The 
reasons behind the need for financial assistance mechanism are briefly examined. The current 
mechanism, as being the foundation for the proposed measure, provides context for the research 
question. Also, the legal framework of the current mechanism is examined before the detailed 
look at the Commission’s proposal. Finally, the Commission’s proposal is examined through 
examining the questions about why the proposal is made, how it is made and what it suggests. 
Third chapter examines the Union competence. The chapter evaluates the notion of the Union 
constitution. The chapter clarifies the legal framework of the competence in the context of the 
EMF. The most important principles related to the research question, the principle of conferral 
and the principle of subsidiarity, are examined in detail. The third chapter, also, introduces the 
flexibility clause and its significance.  
In the fourth chapter, the conditions, which arose from the linguistic interpretation of the 
flexibility clause, are applied into the establishment of the EMF. The chapter aims to test 
                                                 
47 Elina Paunio and Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo, ‘Taking Language Seriously : An Analysis of Linguistic 
Reasoning and Its Implications in EU Law’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal, 396 – 397. 
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whether the proposed measure fulfils these conditions. The chapter focuses on the following 
questions:  whether the Treaties have provided the legal basis, whether the measure is within 
the framework of the Treaties, what are the objectives of Treaties in the context of the EMF and 
whether the establishment of the EMF is necessary.  
In the fifth chapter, the question how national constitutions interconnects the Union competence 
in the context of the flexibility clause and EMF, is examined. The chapter evaluates whether 
the national constitutions make it possible to the flexibility clause to serve as legal basis for the 
establishment of the EMF. Finally, on chapter six, concluding remarks are outlined. 
2 EUROPEAN MONETARY FUND AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS AIMING TO 
SAFEGUARD THE STABILITY OF THE EURO AREA  
2.1 Reasons behind the establishment of the early instruments 
This chapter focuses on the financial assistance regime. In order to understand the research 
problem, it is important to draw some attention to the development of the instruments that have 
been created to stabilize the euro area. For understanding the financial assistance regime, the 
financial crisis is briefly examined. The current mechanism, the ESM, is the basis for the 
proposed EMF and, therefore, it needs to be examined in detail. Finally, this chapter examines 
the Commission’s proposal and the proposed instrument. 
The Commission’s proposal on the establishment of the EMF has not been created in political 
or economic void. Therefore, the earlier instruments, the development of the legal framework 
and the earlier applications of the flexibility clause sheds a light for the reasons why the 
establishment of the EMF is proposed now and why the Commission suggests using the 
flexibility clause. Knowledge of the historical context and political reasons, under which the 
earlier instruments have been established, provide understanding to the instrument now 
proposed. Furthermore, it is impossible to understand the institutional framework without 
reference to previous policy measures. The entrenchment of the term ‘stability’ to EU’s 
constitutional discourse has deepened during the evolution of the institutions and, also, this 
development is briefly examined in this sub-chapter. This sub-chapter examines the financial 
crisis, the financial assistance instruments in the recent history and other tools established 
aiming to stabilize the euro area. However, the complex history of the financial crisis and 
14 
 
instruments aiming to stabilize the financial sector of the euro area can only be briefly outlined 
here due to the limited space.  
The need for special instruments aiming to stabilize the euro area originates from the financial 
and economic crisis. The financial crisis continued as prolonged crisis in the euro area. The 
crisis was not only financial but also economic, fiscal and banking crisis. Fiscal crisis led to 
sovereign debt crisis. The markets began to mistrust the financial standing of some European 
countries, such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal. This was partly because these countries had 
been, possibly due to the lax oversight of banks, coerced to bail out troubled banks. Also, some 
countries were seen riskier because of the deficits were let balloon by the governments. These 
factors led the increase of governments’ budget deficits.48 Due to the quick increase in public 
debt, the Market Participants had less confidence in the liquidity and solvency of these 
countries. The interest rates raised extremely high to these countries. This led to the reduce of 
competitiveness and, over time, these countries started to lose market access. In this situation, 
the need for financial assistance packages was seen inevitable. 
The need for financial assistance has been seen extra high in the euro area. The crisis revealed 
the weaknesses of the financial system of the euro area. The contagion and spillover effects 
between Member States are more likely in the area of single currency than those Member States 
that have different currencies. These effects increase the urge for financial assistance. At the 
peak of the financial crisis, the desire to enhance the confidence of financial markets was 
strong.49 As the economic health of individual euro area Member State can impact on the 
valuation of the single currency, the financial assistance between Member States has been seen 
necessary. Failure of euro area Member State would endanger the whole euro system.50 At the 
time of the financial crisis, there was a need for the establishment of new financial assistance 
mechanisms because there were no instruments to overcome the crisis. The economic policy 
instruments of the EU were too weak and did not prevent unsound budgetary policies by 
                                                 
48 Jale Tosun, Anne Wetzel and Galina Zapryanova, ‘The EU in Crisis: Advancing the Debate’ (2014) 36 Journal of European Integration 195, 197. 
49 Tuori and Tuori (n 45), 85; Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, ‘The European Stability Mechanism: Some Notes on a 
New EU Institution Designed to Avert Financial Crises’ in John Raymond; LaBrosse, Rodrigo; Olivares-Caminal and Dalvinder Singh (eds), Financial crisis containment and government guarantees (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 212. 
50 Filippo Donati, ‘The Euro Crisis, Economic Governance and Democracy in the European Union’ (2013) 5 Italian Journal of Public Law 129, 131.  
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Member States.51 Also, the limited budget of the EU restricted the possibilities to react the 
crisis. The funding from the Union budget is opted out. This caused that the EU did not have 
tools to react to the crisis.52 Therefore, new mechanisms were needed.  
In addition, the crisis revealed the vicious circle, also called the doom loop, between the euro 
area banks and the Member States. It was lightened upon that serious difficulties in the banking 
sector may lead fiscal distress in Member States. On the contrary, banks are exposed to 
sovereign risk. The financial architecture was required to be under reform to weaken the vicious 
circle.53 
The financial assistance instruments within the euro area have been either within or outside the 
union framework. The progression has been from case-by-case bilateral loans to more 
structured institutions. First attempts to create stability was outside the Union framework and 
based on bilateral loans. Member States participating the European Monetary Union, alongside 
the International Monetary Fund, created rescue packages to fund Greece. The bilateral loans 
to Greece were emergency assistance where the terms and structure of the loans were decided 
to this special rescue package. The financial assistance was accompanied with an austerity 
package, which required the adoption of austerity economic policy. 54 The European Financial 
Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), which was a temporary instrument, was the first measure 
based on EU law. It was established in 2010.55  
The EFSM was followed by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). It was created 
by euro area Member States. The financial assistance provided by the EFSF was bilateral and 
the EFSF was created to give financial support to a broader group of Member States. The EFSF 
was created to be temporary. However, it still exists as a legal entity, but it can no longer grant 
new loans.56 The EFSF is a private company, a special purpose vehicle. It must comply with 
                                                 
51 ibid, 148. 
52 Amy Verdun, ‘A Historical Institutionalist Explanation of the EU’s Responses to the Euro Area Financial Crisis’ (2015) 22 Journal of European Public Policy 219. 
53 Spyros Alogoskoufis and Sam Langfield, ‘Regulating the Doom Loop’ (2018) 74, 1. 
54 Financial assistance to Greece, Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, Technical Memorandum of Understanding, 6 August 2010. 
55 Council Regulation, (EU) No 407/2010, establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism [2010] OJ L 118. 
56 EFSF Framework Agreement, adopted 7 June 2010.  
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the Luxemburg law, under which it is established. The shareholders of the company are the 
euro area member States.57 
The current financial assistance instrument, which is further examined in the following sub-
chapter, is the European Stability Mechanism, ESM, was established in 2012. The European 
Council stated already in 2010 that there was a need for a permanent institution as the bilateral 
loans failed to calm the markets and the crisis threatening the financial stability remained. The 
ESM was created to fulfill the need for permanent instrument.58 The ESM is the successor of 
those earlier instruments providing financial assistance to Member States. In fact, the financial 
assistance provisions and instruments have been built on top of earlier institutional structures.59 
For example, the ESM is structurally very similar with the EFSF.60 The decision-making 
process, for example, implies this similarity. The institutions, according to some commentators, 
are structured in such way that in the future they may well become incorporated within the EU 
Treaties.61 The Commission’s proposal represents this idea. The more detailed analysis of the 
ESM is provided in the next sub-chapter. 
One of the aspects of financial assistance in the euro area is the involvement of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF has been involved in the bilateral instruments and the current 
instrument. The IMF is designed to provide countries financial help when the country’s central 
bank runs out with foreign currencies and when borrowing from the private sector is too 
expensive or difficult.62 In a sense, in the euro area the single currency is a foreign currency in 
the eyes of individual Member State, as the central banks of the Member States cannot print 
euro-notes. Therefore, the Member State can run out of euros. When this happens, the financial 
assistance can be provided by the IMF or the other Member States can lend euros. The Member 
                                                 
57 There are two exceptions; Latvia and Lithuania are not shareholders. 
58 Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism, T/ESM 2012-LT/en, signed in 2 February 2012. 
59 Verdun has studied the financial assistance regime through historical institutionalist lenses. Verdun (n 25), 225. 
60 ibid, 227. 
61 Verdun comparises the financial assistance regime to Schengen provisions. Ibid, 232.  
62 Charles Wyplosz, ‘In-Depth Analysis - A European Monetary Fund? Scrutiny Paper Provided in the Context of Economic Dialogues with the President of EUrogroup in the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee’ (2017) 11.  
17 
 
State cannot go to the European Central Bank (ECB) as it is forbidden to the ECB directly lend 
to Member State governments.63 
There have been different instruments aiming to stabilize the euro area. The financial assistance 
instruments have been important, but there have been also other instruments that have similar 
objectives. The ECB launched a government bond purchase program, named as the Securities 
Markets Program.64 The ECB replaced it with the Outright Monetary Transaction Program in 
2012.65 The program has been providing safety net for the euro area Member States through 
buying government bonds in secondary sovereign bond markets and decreasing financing costs 
and interest expenses for Member States.66 Also, the EU has made improvements in the banking 
supervision and bank resolution. These improvements have strong interconnections with the 
public economies of the Member States due to the vicious circle between the banks and the 
Member States. The EU has aimed to weaken that vicious circle and to establish and maintain 
the integrated internal market of the banking services. Therefore, the integration in the field and 
new regulation has been taken. The integration has been taken especially through the 
establishment of the Single Resolution Mechanism and Single Supervision Mechanism. The 
Single Resolution Mechanism is a banking sector resolution system and the Single Supervision 
Mechanism is a banking supervision system.67 
To sum up, this sub-chapter examined the financial assistance regime by exploring the context 
of the financial assistance mechanisms. This context includes the aftermath of the financial 
crisis. After the financial crisis revealed the need for financial assistance, the regime has 
evolved and there have been different instruments providing that assistance. The understanding 
about the reasons behind the financial assistance mechanisms provide important information 
                                                 
63 Article 123(1) TFEU. 
64 ‘ECB decides on measures to address severe tensions in financial markets’ (2010) https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100510.en.html accessed 20 February 2019. 
65 ‘Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions’ (2012) <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html> accessed 20 February 2019. 
66 The purchases from secondary markets are only tools the ECB holds. The ECB is prohibited from granting direct loans to the public sector. Article 123(1) TFEU. 
67 Council Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2014) establishing uniform rules and uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (2013) OJ L 287. 
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for the evaluation of the proposed instrument. Next, the current mechanism is examined in 
detail. 
2.2 The European Stability Mechanism – the current instrument  
The current, permanent, bail-out instrument provides the basic context to the proposed 
instrument. It provides clear insights into the current legal and institutional framework, 
including the amended Treaty provision of the financial assistance mechanism and 
intergovernmental nature of the current system. The EMF is suggested to follow and replace 
the intergovernmental ESM and transfer it to the Union legal framework. After the 
establishment of the EMF, it would take over the ESM as a whole. The EMF would inherit the 
legal position of the ESM, with all its rights and obligations.68  
The ESM is based on an intergovernmental treaty, the Treaty Establishing European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM Treaty).69 Therefore, the ESM is outside the Union framework. The 
commentators have supposed that this was the easiest way to establish the mechanism. 
According to the commentators, the Union lacked the legal basis for the establishment of a 
stability mechanism and it was unlikely that the Member States would have agreed the Treaty 
change needed.70 Even though the ESM Treaty is intergovernmental, the ESM entrusts EU 
institutions, ECB and the Commission, central roles. The roles contain tasks in granting and 
supervising financial assistance.71  
The purposes of the ESM and the proposed EMF are similar. The purpose of the ESM is to 
provide financial assistance to euro area Member States when they are experiencing, or 
threatened by, severe financing problems. The ESM provides a backstop, through funding from 
the capital contributions of the Member States, for euro area governments that are no longer 
able to borrow on the market. The tasks of the ESM are to promote financial stability, 
                                                 
68 The European Commission (n 1), 5. 
69 The ESM Treaty (n 69).   
70 Several commentators have come into the same conclusion. See, e.g. Verdun (n 53). 231; Paul Craig, ‘The New 
Constitutional Architecture of European Economic and Monetary Union’ in Maurice Adams, Federico Fabbrini and Pierre Larouche (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2014) 25; Gianni Lo Schaviavo, ‘The Judicial “Bail Out” of the European Stability Mechanism: Comment on the 
Pringle Case’ (2013) 5 Italian Journal of Public Law, 213. 
71 The ESM Treaty (n 69) article 13.  
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sustainable public finances and restore conditions for growth.72 The financial assistance can 
consist also of financial support for the recapitalization of the financial institutions of a Member 
States.73 The financial assistance can only be given under strict conditionality and if it is 
indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole.74 Practically, the 
financial assistance can be granted if there are remarkably financial needs, but the Member 
State cannot access funds in the markets, either because lenders are unwilling to grant loans, or 
will only do so at unsustainable interest rates. The EMF would inherit these tasks from the 
ESM, as examined further in the next sub-chapter.  
Even though the ESM is an intergovernmental institution, there are strong interconnections with 
the Union. The Council has stated that the objective of the ESM also helps preserving the 
economic and financial stability of the Union itself.75 In the Pringle ruling, the Court drafted 
an idea of higher, abstract objective and primary, concrete objective of the ESM. The abstract 
objective is, according to the court, the financial stability. The concrete objective is the 
budgetary discipline.76 Although, as the ESM is an intergovernmental mechanism, the Court 
does not hold the power to determine its objectives.  
The article 136 TFEU was amended to ensure that the ESM is compatible with EU Law.77 
Under Article 136 paragraph 3 TFEU:  
Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be 
activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The 
granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject 
to strict conditionality.  
                                                 
72 Ibid, article 3. 
73 Ibid, articles 14 – 18. 
74 Ibid, article 3. 
75 European Council Decision 2011/199/EU amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro [2011] OJ L 91, recital, para 4. 
76 Pringle (n 17). 
77 European Council Decision (n 75).  
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However, the amendment was not in force when the ESM was established.78 The Court has 
ruled that the amendment was not needed for the establishment and the Member States could 
have entered into the ESM Treaty even without the amendment.79 According to the Court, the 
amendment confirmed the existence of a power possessed by Member States.80 Therefore, the 
Article 136(3) does not provide the legal basis for the establishment of the ESM and the legal 
basis comes from the intergovernmental Treaty, the ESM Treaty. The Article 136(3) TFEU 
only affirms the legal situation. 
The article 136 TFEU was amended by the simplified amendment procedure under Article 
48(6) TEU. The chosen amendment procedure may implicate on the ESM’s, and more widely 
financial assistance mechanisms’, position on the Union legal system. Amending the Treaties, 
either by simplified or ordinary revision procedure, requires ratification by all Member States 
according to their own constitutional procedures. Key amendments, including increasing 
competence, demands the ordinary revision procedure. The simplified amendment procedure, 
as the name of the procedure implies, can be simpler than the ordinary amendment procedure. 
The procedure can only be used to amend EU’s internal policies and actions.81 However, the 
ordinary amendment procedure can be quick in the right circumstances, such as political mutual 
understanding about the matter. On the contrary, the simplified revision does not necessarily 
mean that the amendment could not be legally, politically, or technically complex.82 
The Court has examined the legality of the ESM in the Union law perspective in the Pringle 
case.83 In the case, Irish national court referred two questions to the Court. The first question 
was about the validity of the Decision 2011/199 that amended the Article 136 TFEU.84 The 
second question was about the Member States’ right to conclude and ratify the ESM Treaty. 
The question on the validity of the Decision 2011/199, had two aspects. Firstly, it was under 
interpretation if the Amendment met the criteria for the simplified procedure under Article 
                                                 
78 The amendment entered into force on 1 January 2013. 
79 Pringle (n 17), paras 73 – 73. See also, Lo Schaviavo (n 71) 208. 
80 Ibid, para 184. 
81 Article 48(6) TEU. 
82 S Peers, ‘The Future of EU Treaty Amendments’ (2012) 31 Yearbook of European Law 17, 36. 
83 Pringle (n 17). 
84 European Council Decision (n 75).  
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48(6) TEU and whether it increased the powers conferred on the EU. The second aspect 
concerned the harmony of the Amendment with the Treaties and general principles of EU law.85 
The Court ruled that the establishment of the ESM did not breach the Treaties.86 The ruling has 
significance, also, in the evaluation whether the ESM could be transferred into the Union 
framework. 
In conclusion, the ESM as current mechanism is the basis for the now proposed new instrument. 
As the ESM is intergovernmental institution established by the Member States of the euro area, 
it is not based on the EU law. However, the strong interconnections with the EU make the 
boundaries between the international law and EU law vague in this exact issue. The sources 
examined in this sub-chapter, the intergovernmental ESM Treaty, the amendment to the article 
136 TFEU and the Court’s Pringle ruling, serve as the basic sources and the basis for the 
evaluation whether the ESM could be transferred to the Union legal system. These sources are 
examined later in the thesis in many ways. 
2.3 Proposed European Monetary Fund  
The Commission proposed the establishment of the EMF on 6 December 2017. There has, also, 
been earlier discussion on the need for a regional monetary fund and the Commission was not 
the first one coming up with the idea. There have been suggestions on both academic and 
political discussion. However, the Commission’s proposal is not fully compatible with the 
earlier suggestions. This sub-chapter examines, after briefly discussing the discussion before 
the current proposal, what is proposed, why it is proposed and how it is proposed.  
The idea of regional monetary fund is not new. Suggestions have appeared especially in the 
moment of financial crisis.87 For example, Asian Monetary Fund was proposed during the East 
Asian crisis in the 1990s.88 The Asian Monetary Fund was never established, but the discussion 
                                                 
85 Tuori and Tuori (n 45), 146. 
86 Pringle (n 17). 
87 It is not coincidence that the suggestions relate in occasions of crisis. The political agreement is difficult in bilateral loans and more structured frameworks are easier way to negotiate financial assistance. This was, also, the 
reasoning behind the proposed Asian Monetary Fund, see. Saori N Katada, ‘Banking on Stability: Japan and the Cross-Pacific Dynamics of International Financial Crisis Management’ [2001] University of Michigan Press, 196. 
88 Japanese government made the proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund at the G7-IMF meeting in Hong Kong during the East Asian crisis at 1997.   
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concerning regional monetary fund stayed. In European context, suggestions for a regional 
monetary fund have appeared especially after the financial crisis.89 However, the Commission’s 
proposal is the first Union based initiative in the issue.  
Earlier suggestions about the European Monetary Fund have been based on the solidarity 
principle or the doctrine of implied powers. Before the current debate, in the center of the 
discussion has been the idea of a fund based on the Union’s solidarity principle.90 However, the 
Court have rejected the idea of the fund based on solidarity.91 Therefore, the idea of the fund 
based on solidarity is no longer valid. As for discussion on the fund based on the implied 
powers, the Court has not excluded that the implied powers could not provide the legal basis 
for the fund. The notion of implied powers refers to the idea, found in the Court’s case law, that 
the existence of a given power or objective implies the existence of any other power that is 
reasonably necessary for the exercise of the former. 92 Some commentators argue that the 
achievement of the ECB’s objectives requires the achievement of financial stability.93 The ECB 
cannot, however, perform the tasks of the ESM because of the institutional power division of 
the Union. Also, as stated above, the ECB is prohibited to provide loans to the Member States.94 
Therefore, it could be argued that the powers attributed to the ECB implies powers to establish 
EMF. However, due to the scope of the thesis, this alternative legal basis for the fund is not 
discussed here further. 
The now proposed EMF is not equivalent with the previous suggestions. The form of the 
initiative is a proposal for a Council Regulation. Accordingly, the proposal seeks for secondary 
                                                 
89 Daniel Gros and T Mayer, ‘How to Deal with Sovereign Default in Europe: Create the European Monetary Fund 
Now!’ [2010] CEPS Policy Brief 1, 2. 
90 The idea is based on the third subparagraph of the article 3(3) TEU and the Article 122(1) TFEU. Under these provisions the Union promotes solidarity between the member States and the Council may take a measure that is appropriate to the economic situation in a spirit of solidarity. However, the Court has rejected the idea of Article 122(1), and, therefore, solidarity principle, providing legal basis for such financial assistance as ESM provides. See, Pringle (n 17), para 115. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Judgement of 29 November 1956, Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique, 8/55, EU:C:1956:11; judgement of 9 July 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany, 281/85, EU:C:1987:351; judgement of 9 July 1987, Germany v Commission, joined cases 281, 283 – 285 and 287/85, EU:1987/351; judgement of 17 September 2007, French v Commission, T-240/04, EU:T:2007:290; judgement of 17 November 2009, MTZ Polyfilms v Council, T-143/06, EU:T:2009:441. 
93 Michael Waibel, ‘Monetary Policy : An Exclusive Competence Only in Name ?’ (2017) 11/2017, 19. 
94 Article 123(1) TFEU.  
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legislation, that would establish the EMF. The establishment of the EMF as now proposed 
would transfer the ESM to an EU agency. The creation of the new instrument would transform 
the role of government-controlled ESM into EMF under Union’s parliamentary control and 
anchored in EU law. The Emf would be significantly similar with the ESM. The objectives of 
the proposed EMF are equivalent with the ESM. Similarities include, also, the institutions of 
the EMF. These institutions, the Board of Governors, the Board of Directors and the Managing 
Director, are identical to those of the ESM.95 
The proposal is structured as follows. The proposal itself includes an explanatory part and the 
suggested regulation. The annex includes the suggested statute of the EMF. The Commission 
examines the context of the proposal, legal basis, subsidiarity and proportionality aspects, 
fundamental rights aspects and budgetary implications. The proposal, also, explains the specific 
provisions of the proposal in detail. 
The Commission recommends, simply, transfer of the current mechanism into the Union legal 
framework. The fund would hold legal personality and its members would be the Union 
Member States that have the euro as currency. The objective of the EMF would be to contribute 
to the financial stability of the euro area, as well as the financial stability of the ‘participating 
Member States’, i.e. a Member State whose currency is not the euro that has established a close 
cooperation with the ECB. For the achievement of its’ aims the EMF would mobilize funding 
and provide stability support under strict conditionality. The financial assistance would be 
available for Member States that are experiencing, or threatened by, severe financial problems. 
The financial assistance is only possible if it is indispensable to safeguard the financial stability 
of the euro area as a whole or of its Members.96 
According to the proposal, the EMF’s objective is to contribute to safeguarding the financial 
stability of the euro area, as well as the financial stability of the 'participating Member States'.97 
The objective of the EMF includes reducing risks to financial stability.98 The financial 
assistance would help attaining the objective of risk reduction. According to the proposal, the 
                                                 
95 Ibid, Article 4(1) of the Annex. 
96 The European Commission (n 1), Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Annex. 
97 The European Commission (n 1), Article 3 of the Annex. 
98 Ibid, 12.  
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precautionary financial assistance can sustain sound economic policies and avert economic 
crisis. Precautionary financial assistance aims helping EMF Members to get financing from 
markets by strengthening the credibility and providing a safety-net.99 Also, the proposal 
suggests that the EMF would provide backstop for the Single Resolution Fund. However, after 
the proposal was given, Eurogroup has decided that the ESM provides the backstop.  100 
Therefore, the proposal would not add any new tasks through the backstop as the decision has 
been made elsewhere. 
The EMF would change the decision-making process from the ESM. The fundamental 
decisions are made by the Board of Governors consisting of the financial ministers of the euro 
area Member States.101 The similar institution makes fundamental decisions in the ESM as 
well.102 However, the proposed EMF would change the number of votes needed for granting 
financial assistance. The decisions are made unanimous in the EMF. Therefore, the Member 
States must mutually agree to the financial assistance package.103 In the proposed EMF, the 
decision of providing a stability support to an EMF Member requires reinforced qualified 
majority, which is 85 percent of the votes cast.104 
According to the Commission, the establishment of the EMF is next logical step in the 
deepening of the EMU. The Commission justifies the proposal on unity, efficiency and 
democratic accountability. The Commission argues that the euro area crisis preparedness 
requires EMF.105  The Commission suggests that the flexibility clause would serve as legal basis 
for the establishment. The Commission’s view is that the regulation on the establishment of the 
EMF fulfils the conditions that the flexibility clause sets. It is also mentioned in the proposal 
that applying the clause would not be extraordinary, because the clause has already been applied 
                                                 
99 Ibid, 22, recital 44. 
100 Euro Summit Statement, EURO 502/18 [2018], Eurosummit 2 TSGC 9; Eurogroup report to Leaders on EMU deepening (2018), <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/12/04/eurogroup-report-to-leaders-on-emu-deepening/pdf> accessed 6 February 2019. 
101 The European Commission (n 1), Article 5(1) of the Annex. 
102 The ESM Treaty (n 69), Articles 4, 5. 
103 The ESM Treaty (n 69) article 4(3). 
104 The European Commission (n 1), Articles 4(4), 5(7) of the Annex. 
105 Ibid, 2 – 3. 
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in historically significant measures, such as measures establishing European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund, the European Currency Unit and the balance of payment mechanisms.  
In conclusion, this chapter has examined the financial assistance regime, the ESM and the EMF. 
The understanding about the evolution of the regime is important for the knowledge of the 
proposed institution. The chapter shed light to the reasons behind the financial assistance 
instruments and examined the different institutions. The chapter viewed the current mechanism 
and its background. In addition, the chapter compared the ESM and the proposed EMF between 
each other. In conclusion, the most important changes are changes in the legal status and 
decision-making process. The establishment would change the legal status of the 
intergovernmental mechanism to Union agency. Also, the establishment would change the 
decision-making process from the unanimity voting into the reinforced qualified majority 
voting of 85 percent of the votes.  
3 THE QUESTION OF COMPETENCE  
3.1 The EU Constitution 
The Union constitution determines whether the flexibility clause can serve as legal basis for the 
establishment of the EMF. This chapter focuses on the constitutional features of the Union that 
influence on the application of the flexibility clause in the establishment of the EMF. Firstly, 
the Union constitution is examined. The examination of the nature of the Union constitution 
works as context for the research question. After the examination of the Union constitution 
generally, the important features of the Union constitution for the research question are 
examined. The examination starts with the principle of conferral, which stipulates that the 
Union can only act within the limits of the powers attributed to it by Member States. The 
principle of conferral sets the base for the Union actions and effects on other constitutional 
features of the Union. The flexibility clause is, also, based on the principle of conferral. The 
detailed examination of the flexibility clause clarifies the application of the clause in specific 
cases, such as the establishment of the EMF. The examination includes the article 352 and its 
predecessors. Also, other constitutional features that has impact on the application of the 
flexibility clause in the establishment of the EMF are studied. The division of the competence 
in different categories impacts on the application of the flexibility clause in the context of the 
establishment of the EMF. Additionally, the principle of subsidiarity, which stipulates that 
Union can only act if the desired objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
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States, but can rather be better achieved at Union level, is examined as it has impact on the 
application of the flexibility clause in the establishment of the EMF. 
The question, whether the flexibility clause can be used to establish the EMF, is a constitutional 
question. It is important to examine what the EU constitution means and how it deviates from 
the nation-state constitution. This examination helps to determine the boundaries of the 
competence in the specific application of the constitution, the establishment of the EMF through 
using the flexibility clause. Notably, the notion of the constitution in nation state context is not 
fully equivalent with the notion of the constitution in the Union context. The differences 
between these two viewpoints reveal the identity of the Union constitution. There is not 
universally accepted and valid definition of the constitution. There are, however, certain 
elements that can be identified.106 The word constitution usually prescribes the extent and 
manner of the exercise of sovereign powers, it organizes the government and lists the rights of 
the citizens and how these rights are protected. A constitution is often described as a 
fundamental law.107 A nation-state constitution is often understood as written guidelines for 
self-governance by people to government agents.108 These interpretations of the notion of 
competence do not fully respond to the identity of the EU constitution. 
However, the notion of the constitution is customary in the EU context as well.109 The EU 
constitution has special characteristics. These can be divided into three main features. Firstly, 
the EU constitution is evolutionary. Compared with the nation-state constitution, which is 
usually a stationary single normative entity, the EU constitution is more dynamic unity 
consisting of more than one source. The term constitutionalisation describes the process-like 
nature of the EU constitution.110 Nation-state constitutions are often changed under a strict 
legislative procedure. In the Union, the constitution can be changed in several ways. One way 
                                                 
106 The EU constitution is sometimes compared with the nation-state constitution and their formation under impression that using a word constitution refers to federal state. However, the political question of the federal evolution is not discussed here. 
107 Jean-Claude Piris, ‘Does the European Union Have a Constitution? Does It Need One?’ (2000) 3. 
108 James A Gardner, ‘What Is a State Constitution’ (1993) 24 Rutgers Law Journal, 1024. 
109 The Court has used it in several judgements. See, e.g. judgement of 23 April 1986, Les Verts, C- 403/03, EU:C:1986:166, paragraph 23; Opinion of the Court of 26 April 1977, Opinion 1/76, EU:C:1977:63, para 12; Judgement of the Court of 23 March 1993, Beate Weber v European Parliament, C-314/91, EU:C:1993:109, para 8. 
110 Tuori and Tuori (n 45), 3.  
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is to change the Treaties and this process is under a strict legislative procedure. The 
constitutionalisation is, however, often driven by the Court. The Court has often led the 
integration further and many of the principles that have been crucial to the integration have 
been found in the case law.111 However, the process-like nature does not mean that the process 
always leads integration forward.112  
Secondly, the EU constitution is not based on single written constitutional act. Nation-state 
constitutions are usually legislative entities. The EU constitution can be described more like a 
functional constitution. It is said that the existence of a constitution does not depend on the 
adaption but on the functionality of the constitution. Therefore, the lack of a single written 
entity does not mean that the constitution would not exist. It is, however, required for the 
existence of a constitution that the constitution is respected.113  
Thirdly, the EU constitution is brought through constitutional speech acts, which include more 
than the legislative acts. In nation-state context, a constitution is often brought by a 
revolutionary constitutional event.114 In the EU constitution, speech acts are issued by relevant 
constitutional actors115, such as the Treaties and the Court acting as the constitutional court of 
the EU.116 EU constitutional scholarship is trying to assess the weight of the interventions by 
those constitutional actors.117 The EU Treaties have been considered as ‘constitutional charter’ 
by the Court.118  
These three factors have impact on the research question. Because of the exceptional nature of 
the EU constitution, the determination of the boundaries of the competence, which is required 
to find out whether the flexibility clause can serve as legal basis for the establishment of the 
                                                 
111 These include basic principles of the Union, such as the direct effect found in the Van Gend & Loos ruling and the supremacy of the Union law found in the Costa v Enel ruling. See, e.g. Van Gend & Loos (n 54); judgement of 15 July 1964, Costa v Enel, C 6-64, EU:C:1964:66. 
112 Hunt and Shaw (n 19) 106 
113 Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (2007) Oxford University Press, chapter 3.3. 
114 Tuori (n 38). 
115 ibid, 113. 
116 Tuori and Tuori also sees other actors as relevant constitutional actors. The actors are the Commission and the Council, the ECB, constitutional scholars and even national constitutional courts. Tuori and Tuori (n 45), 3, 6. 
117 Ibid, 6. 
118 This is found originally in Les Verts ruling. The Court has referred to the notion in its other cases as well. Les Verts (n 111) para 23. See also, Opinion 1/76 (n 111) para 12; Beate Weber (n 111), para 8. 
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EMF, is not straightforward. As two main constitutional actors, the Treaties and the Court has 
a significant role when determining the boundaries of the competence. The Treaties set 
foundations for the evaluation of the competence. The Court’s interpretations are legally 
binding and are inseparable part of the EU’s constitution. These special features of the notion 
of Union constitution provide context for the evaluation of the specific constitutional 
innovations of the Union, such as the principle of conferral which is examined next. 
3.2 The principle of conferral 
The principle of conferral is a fundamental principle of the Union. The EU does not have any 
inherent powers and the functioning of it is based on the powers delegated from the sovereign 
Member States. The Union can only act within the limits of the powers attributed to it by 
Member States. The principle of conferral implies the nature of the Union. The principle is 
phrased in the Article 5(2) TEU. This provision governs the limits to EU competence. Under 
the Article 5(2) TEU: 
Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of 
the competence conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to 
attain the objectives set out therein. Competence not conferred upon the 
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.  
The principle makes the Treaties the only source for the competence. Thus, all Union actions 
should be based on this principle. The Union measures must aim to attain an objective stated in 
the Treaties. The Treaties either expressly state certain powers to attain a certain objective or 
the powers are implied in the expressly stated objectives. The latter includes application of the 
flexibility clause. In either way, the objectives set by the Treaties limit the competence.119 On 
the one hand, the principle of conferral limits the exercise of the competence, as the Union 
should only act on the limits of the competence attributions from the Member States. On the 
other hand, the principle limits the existence of the competence, as the competence that is not 
conferred to the Union upon the Treaties remain with the Member States. 
                                                 
119 Carl Lebeck, ‘Implied Powers Beyond Functional Integration? The Flexibility Clause in the Revised EU 
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The principle of conferral is based on the idea that it is possible to determine the limited scope 
of the conferred powers. The limited scope is easier to determine when the powers are explicitly 
stated in the Treaty provisions. As for competence based completely on the objectives of the 
Union, the boundaries are less clear. The boundaries of the competence get even more indistinct 
if the objectives are unclear or wide.120 
The establishment of Union measures, including the secondary law, requires that the Member 
States have conferred the necessary competence to the Union. This applies, also, to the 
measures taken through application of the flexibility clause.121 Therefore, the principle of 
conferral influences on the establishment of the EMF through secondary law. The question, 
whether the proposed regulation is in accordance with the principle of conferral has deep 
interconnections with the research question. The answers to the questions should be the same. 
If the answer to the research question is positive, and the flexibility clause can serve as legal 
basis for the establishment of the EMF, the answer to the question, whether the measure is in 
accordance with the principle of conferral, should also be positive. 
To sum up, the principle of conferral stipulates the outer boundaries of the Union competence. 
The determination of these boundaries is critical in order to trace whether the flexibility clause 
can serve as legal basis for the establishment of the EMF. Therefore, the principle of conferral 
is kept in mind and evaluated throughout the evaluation of the research question. 
3.3 The Article 352 TFEU – the Flexibility clause 
One of the constitutional oddities of the Union, among the other special characteristics, is the 
flexibility clause under article 352 TFEU. The Commission proposes applying the flexibility 
clause for the establishment of the EMF. The clause, the article 352 TFEU, has a special role in 
the Union legal system. This sub-chapter focuses on the evolvement of the flexibility clause. 
The purpose of the flexibility clause is to provide subsidiary and residual powers for the Union. 
Under the flexibility clause, the EU can take measures that are necessary to attain one of the 
objectives of the Treaties even when the Treaties do not provide such powers. The requirement, 
                                                 
120 Jan H Jans, ‘Stop the Integration Principle?’ 33:1533 Frodham International Law Journal. 
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that the Treaties have not provided expressly stated powers implies the subsidiary nature of the 
clause.122 The clause provides the legal basis for unforeseen cases and unforeseen 
circumstances given to the residual nature of the clause.123 The clause is often justified with the 
need for ‘emergency clause’ when the high-speed changes in the economic, in the politics or in 
the technology have left the Treaty provisions outdated or created caps in the expressly stated 
competence.124  
The flexibility clause, in some form, has remained in part of the Union legal system since the 
early stages of the integration. The article 352 TFEU is a successor to Article 235 Treaty 
establishing European Economic Community and Article 308 Treaty establishing the European 
Community. The flexibility clause has remained similar, by the principle, but the form, wording 
and significance has varied over time. The flexibility clause played an important role especially 
in the 1970s and 1980s.125 One of the most significant examples of the usage of the flexibility 
clause is the environmental policy. The Community used the Article 308 EC to establish a new 
policy area.126 The growth of the environmental policy not only added Community’s powers 
but also objectives.127 However, the environmental policy, among others, was added to the 
official Treaty framework by Single European Act in 1987.  
As the environmental policy was added into the Union legal framework by applying the 
flexibility clause, one could think that other policy areas could be added by applying the article 
                                                 
122 Franziska Tschofen, ‘Article 235 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community : Potential Conflicts Between the Dynamics of Lawmaking in the Community and National Constitutional Principles’ (1991) 12 Michigan Journal of International Law, 485. 
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352 TFEU. Nevertheless, there are elements precluding such enlargement of the scope of the 
Union. One of the main reasons preventing the enlargement is the changed phrasing of article 
352 TFEU. The phrasing precludes taking measures that are not within the framework of the 
policies of the Union. This precludes integrating new policy areas through applying the 
flexibility clause.128 Also, the other conditions for the use of the flexibility clause, as described 
in the next sub-chapter, has become stricter since the environmental policy was added. 
Therefore, a new policy area cannot be added into the selection of Union competence through 
applying the flexibility clause. 
The role of the flexibility clause has been under academic debates during the different stages 
of the integration. At the 1970’s, there were two different scholarships that had different 
opinions on the position and the importance of the flexibility clause. The first school saw the 
flexibility clause only being able to fill gaps in those areas in which the Community had already 
been given specific powers. According to this school, there are no objectives outside expressly 
stated policy fields. The school claims that the legislators make intentional acts and, therefore, 
the legislator indicates the areas that are meant to be regulated by expressly stating these policy 
fields. The areas that are not expressly stated are not intended to be within the Union 
competence. The other school was in favor for wider application of the flexibility clause. They 
interpreted that the flexibility clause was established to fill any gap between the Treaty’s aims 
and its powers. They saw the Community’s competence as the sum of its objectives.129 The 
Court has favored the latter.130 However, despite the Court’s rulings, the conceptual limits to 
the competence have been difficult to identify.131 
The phrasing of the flexibility clause was not changed significantly until the Lisbon Treaty 
when the article 352 was established. The phrasing of article 352 has its basis in the European 
Convention and the Draft Treaty. The Laeken Declaration wondered, on the one hand, whether 
the flexibility clause leads to the creeping expansion of the competence of the Union. The 
Laeken Declaration was, on the other hand, worried on the European dynamic. The working 
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group of the Draft Treaty came into a conclusion, that the flexibility clause should be retained. 
However, the working group stated that the flexibility clause should not give an impression that 
the Union could itself define its competence.132 These considerations made their way in the 
current phrasing of the flexibility clause. 
The possible scope for the use of the flexibility clause has widened in the Lisbon Treaty. Article 
352 TFEU is widely worded, and it could serve as the basis for competence in almost all areas 
of EU Law133, unlike the earlier versions of the clause, where the use was restricted only to the 
measures that were necessary to the internal market.134 The reason for the enlargement in the 
scope of the clause is due to the changes of the Union. The amount of the Union objectives has 
increased compared with the former Community, so the scope of the flexibility clause has also 
enlarged.135  
Although the scope of the clause has enlarged from the internal market issues to other areas as 
well, the actual recourse to the clause has decreased. The clause is today more difficult to use 
and the Council’s recourse to the clause has been uncommon.136 There are several reasons for 
this trend. The need to use the flexibility clause was earlier high due to the lack of explicitly 
stated competence in the Treaties. The Treaties has gone through reforms and those reforms 
have increased expressly stated legal bases in the Treaties. Therefore, the need for open 
provision is not that likely. In addition to the increased competence stated in the Treaties, the 
operational requirements and constraints have become stricter. The requirement of the consent 
of the European Parliament influences the application of the flexibility clause.137 Previously, 
the clause required the Commission to only consult the European Parliament138. Also, the 
obligation to notify the national parliaments has led to the subsidiarity checks when the 
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flexibility clause is used. The strict legislative procedure is required due to the exceptional 
character of the clause.  
The Court’s case law and the national case law of the Member States have limited the 
application of the clause. The Council recourses to the flexibility clause less frequently due to 
the Court’s self-restraint. The Court has given two main Opinions in the issue. First, more 
significant in the context of the research question, Opinion 2/94, prohibit using the flexibility 
clause in a way that would change the Union’s legal framework fundamentally. The idea behind 
the opinion is that the flexibility clause cannot be used in a way that would avoid using the 
Treaty amendment procedure.139 Second, Opinion 1/94, precludes using the flexibility clause 
to confer exclusive competence.140 Less obvious reason, for the uncommon application of the 
flexibility clause is the statements of national parliaments and constitutional courts. The special 
procedures set by the national parliaments for measures that involve flexibility clause set 
powerful warning to the Union not to use the flexibility clause with feeble arguments.141 
Due to these reasons, the use of the flexibility clause is quite rare. Article 352 has been used 
only about three or four times a year. Some commentators have claimed that the legal proposals 
involving article 352 TFEU are rather trivial.142 Indeed, when taking closer look at the examples 
of the recent application, the list seems short and includes insignificant regulations and 
decisions.143 Undoubtedly, the flexibility clause has become less powerful. The application in 
the establishment of the EMF would be exceptional and change of course. 
In conclusion, the flexibility clause has developed throughout the integration process and its 
significance has varied. The Lisbon Treaty changed the phrasing of the clause, and after the 
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new phrasing the actual recourse to the clause have been unusual. Therefore, the establishment 
of the EMF through application of the flexibility clause would be, to some extent, unexpected. 
3.4 The categories of the competence 
The Treaties divide the competence into three different categories, which are exclusive, shared 
and supportive competence. In addition to these three categories, there is also a special “co-
ordination category”. Different policy areas are divided into different categories based on the 
question whether the EU can take actions in that certain policy field. Therefore, the different 
categories determine the boundaries of the Union competence. The importance of the division 
of the competence in the research question is related to the need to determine the boundaries of 
the Union competence. The category under which the EMF falls needs to be determined in order 
to answer the research question. 
If the Union has exclusive competence in the area, only the Union can legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts. The Member States has only competence to implement these acts. Exclusive 
competence covers e.g. monetary policy.144 Within shared competence, the competence is 
shared between the EU and the Member States. The Member States can act only if the EU has 
not exercised its competence. 145 The category of shared competence covers e.g. the internal 
market. Within supportive competence, the Union can take supporting, coordinating, or 
supplementary actions. Supportive competence covers e.g. education.146  
In addition to these three categories, EU sets up arrangements, under which the Member States 
must co-ordinate their policies.147 This sui generis “category” includes areas of economic, 
social and employment policies. This category does not fit the division of three categories. The 
economic coordination is led by the EU institutions, mainly the Commission. However, the EU 
does not have competence to coordinate the economic policies of the Member States, but the 
Member States coordinate their economic policies within the Union.148 The coordination can 
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be described as deliberative intergovernmentalism.149 In principle, the Union plays a merely 
coordinating role mainly through soft-law150.151 Also, the Court has interpreted that the Treaties 
limit, in the field of economic policy, the Union holds only competence to the coordinating 
measures.152 However, the economic policy competence has also been understood having 
characteristics from all categories. For example, sanctions that concern issues in the field of 
economic policy, are, in a sense, within exclusive competence.153 Therefore, economic policy 
can be understood being under a system of multiple competence.154  
The determination of the category that the EMF falls within, is necessary in order to find out 
whether the Union holds competence to establish the EMF through applying the flexibility 
clause. The categories determine whether the EU can take the action. The question whether the 
EMF falls within the monetary or the economic policy needs to be evaluated.  
This question culminates in the asymmetry between the monetary and the economic policy. The 
economic nature of the proposed EMF is similar with the ESM. Although the name of the 
proposed institution is monetary fund155, there have been accusations that the fund would be 
economic in nature.156 Even though both policies are part of the EMU, the competence in these 
policy areas differ from each other. In the field of economic policy, the Member States are 
supposed to coordinate their economic policies within the EU, but the EU itself does not have 
competence to coordinate these policies. The Member States still hold sovereignty over 
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economic policy. As for monetary policy, the EU has exclusive competence and the Member 
States can only take implementing actions. 
The division between these two policy areas is not straightforward. Several commentators have 
seen this division impossible.157 The policy areas are, indeed, deeply interconnected. In the 
economic literature the monetary policy, accompanied with the fiscal policy, is usually 
inseparable part of the economic policy.158 According to some commentators, the economic 
policy and the monetary policy have an inherent factual link between each other and therefore 
the division is always artificial.159 However, in the Union these policy areas are separated and 
the division has practical significance when determining the boundaries of the competence. The 
Union measures always fall under one of the categories, and, in principle, it is not possible that 
a measure would fall under multiple categories. Therefore, the establishment of the EMF cannot 
fall into both monetary and economic policy. 
The Treaties neither defines the monetary policy nor the economic policy.160 Definition of 
monetary and economic policies can be found in the case law of the Court. The Court has tested 
the division between monetary and economic policy in two cases. Firstly, the Court tested the 
division in the context of the ESM in the Pringle ruling.161 Secondly, the Court tested it in the 
context of the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme in the Gauweiler 
case.162 The questions were opposite in these cases. In the Pringle, the Court tested whether a 
measure was under monetary policy and came into a conclusion that it was under economic 
policy. In the Gauweiler, the Court tested whether a measure was under economic policy and 
came into a conclusion that it was under monetary policy. 
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In the Pringle ruling, the Court defined the distinction of the policies principally by the 
indication of objectives. Also, the Court ruled that the instruments should be given relevance in 
the evaluation.163 The Court tested whether the establishment of the ESM was within Union’s 
exclusive competence, and, therefore could not have been established by Member States. The 
phrasing of the question was, therefore, contrary to the EMF, as the open question in the EMF 
is whether the Union holds competence to establish EMF. The Court evaluated whether the 
objectives of the ESM fall within monetary policy. The Court ruled that the ESM was under 
economic policy. The Court argued as follows: as the objective of the monetary policy is to 
maintain price stability164, and the ESM’s objective is to safeguard the stability of the euro area, 
the objectives are clearly distinct. Therefore, the possible indirect effects of the stability of the 
euro area to the monetary stability do not mean that the economic policy measure could be 
treated as a monetary policy measure.165 
As for the Gauweiler ruling, the Court reinforced that the categorization between the monetary 
and the economic policy is made principally through examination of the objectives, and, 
subsidiarily, of the instruments.166 The Court evaluated whether the ECB’s OMT programme 
was under monetary policy. The referring court, the German Constitutional Court, asked, inter 
alia, whether the mandate of the ECB is exceeded. The referring court argued that the breach 
could be based on the features of the programme that reflected conditionality, selectivity, 
parallelism and circumvention. According to the referring court, the ECB’s mandate was 
exceeded because the purchases were linked to the financial assistance programmes, the 
purchases concerned selected Member States only, the purchases were parallel with the 
financial assistance programmes and the purchases circumvented the conditions and limitations 
of those financial assistance programmes. The starting point of the referring court was different 
in comparison with the Court’s starting point. As the referring court argued based on the interest 
spreads, the Court evaluated the objectives. The Court viewed the objectives of the OMT 
programme and came into a conclusion that the programme was under monetary policy, and, 
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therefore, did not exceed the ECB’s monetary policy mandate.167 Also, the Court repeated the 
idea established in the Pringle ruling that a measure cannot be treated as equivalent to measures 
of another policy area merely because it may have implications for that area.168 
The Proposal does not explicitly state on which category the measure would fall. However, the 
Proposal evaluates the conditions of the subsidiarity principle. The subsidiarity principle, as 
examined in next sub-chapter, only applies within non-exclusive competence. Therefore, the 
Commission, has understood the EMF being under policy area that is categorized as non-
exclusive. Accordingly, as the monetary policy is under exclusive policy, the Commission has 
seen that the EMF is not under that policy area. 
The Court’s test for the category through examining the objectives leads to the same conclusion. 
In the Pringle case, the Court ruled that the creation of a stability mechanism is under economic 
policy.169 Even though the case considered ESM, the interpretation most likely consider the 
EMF, also, due to the equivalent objectives. According to the Proposal, the objective of the 
EMF is to contribute to safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area or participating 
Member States.170 In the Pringle, the Court ruled that the ESM’s objective was under economic 
policy. The objectives of the EMF and the ESM are mostly the same. However, the phrasing of 
the EMF’s objective differs from the ESM Treaty, which refers to “financial stability of the 
euro area as a whole and of its Member States”. The phrase “as a whole” is deleted and “and” 
has been replaced with “or". Even though this is a very important shift, it does not have an 
effect on the interpretation on the category of the competence. This is because of the widening 
of the scope of application does not change the nature of the financial assistance or the scope 
of the objective. In this issue, the establishment of the EMF is compatible with Pringle ruling 
and the objective can be classified as economic rather than monetary.  
The Court also mentions the instruments as a test for distinction between the monetary and 
economic policy. The evaluation of the instruments, also, leads to the conclusion that the EMF 
falls within the economic policy. The ESM has instruments that are classified economic. The 
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packages usually require from the receiving Member States certain, dictated economic 
measures, often including cuts from social policy funding. If the Union establishes the EMF 
within the Union legal framework, these fiscal requirements that the financial assistance 
package is accompanied with, originates from the Union institution. 
The proposed measure seems to fall under economic policy. This may be problematic, as the 
competence in the area of economic policy are limited to the coordinative measures. The 
flexibility clause cannot be used to take measures that the Union does not hold competence to 
take. However, the flexibility clause has played a role in the development of the EMU despite 
the limited economic policy competence. The clause was used when the European Monetary 
Cooperation fund was established in 1973171, when the Community loans were established172 
and to the development of these instruments173. The flexibility clause has been, more recently, 
applied in the Union borrowing scheme in 2002.174 The Commission, also, proposed that the 
flexibility clause could be used to establish a financial assistance scheme for non-euro Member 
States, but the legislation was never adopted.175 
Evidently, the Council cannot take a measure that deviates from the Treaties and competence 
framework. Accordingly, the change of Union competence in the field of economic policy 
requires a Treaty change through the Treaty amendment procedure. The flexibility clause 
cannot be used, as described above in the sub-chapter 3.3, to add economic policy into a 
different category of competence. 
3.5 Principle of subsidiarity 
The principle of subsidiarity is a significant Union principle safeguarding the Member States’ 
sovereignty. The principle acts as a gatekeeper of EU actions expanding further. It governs the 
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174 Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 establishing a facility providing medium-term financial assistance for Member States' balances of payments [2002] OJ L 53. 
175 ‘The role of the ‘Flexibility Clause’: Article 352’ (2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/role-flexibility-clause_en.pdf> accessed 21 February 2019. 
40 
 
use of competence and the flexibility clause. Due to the role of the principle in the determination 
of the boundaries of the Union competence, the principle has effect on the establishment of the 
EMF. 
The principle of subsidiarity governs the use of competence, if the EU takes actions that do not 
fall in the area of exclusive competence. Under Article 5(3) TEU the Union can  
act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at 
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of 
the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.  
The legal basis comes, also, from the Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. The idea behind the principle is that matters should be 
addressed the level closest to those effected.176 The principle works as limitation to the Union 
actions. The need for the principle is based on the idea that in the areas that competence is not 
exclusive, there should be specific reason to take an action in the Union level. Existence of the 
flexibility clause also emphasizes the need for a principle that restricts the competence in 
procedural norms rather than substantive norms.177  
The principle of subsidiarity is a relatively new principle in the Union legal framework. It was 
first established in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. The Single Act had already referred to the 
idea behind the principle in the context of environmental law. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
amended the protocol on subsidiarity into Treaties. The Lisbon Treaty developed the principle 
further. The Treaty change added the regional and local dimension of the principle in the Treaty 
framework and created a new role to the national parliaments to ensure compliance with the 
principle. The national parliaments are the monitors of the principle under subsidiarity principle 
mechanism.178 Under the mechanism, the Commission is bound to send legal proposals to 
national parliaments and the national parliaments then check the compliance of the measure 
                                                 
176 Craig and De Búrca (n 12), 95. 
177 Lebeck (n 120). 
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with the principle.179 However, the mechanism is non-binding as the Union is not required to 
respect the findings of national parliaments.180 
The principle of subsidiarity can be considered as a test for Union actions. According to the 
Commission, the test is twofold: a test consists of a test of comparative efficiency and a 
proportionality test.181 The first test is that the area concerned is not within the exclusive 
competence and the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States. 
Therefore, the EU intervention is necessary. The second test is that the action can be 
implemented more successfully by the EU, and, for that reason the EU intervention adds value. 
Accordingly, the principle of subsidiarity relates to the principle of proportionality and the 
flexibility clause, which requires that the measure, which is established through application of 
the clause, is necessary. 
The interconnections between the principle of subsidiarity and the flexibility clause is not 
limited to the necessity test. The flexibility clause requires subsidiarity monitoring and under 
the second paragraph of Article 352 TFEU:  
Using the procedure for monitoring the subsidiarity principle referred to in 
Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the Commission shall draw 
national Parliaments' attention to proposals based on this Article. 
The principle only applies to the areas that do not fall within the exclusive competence. The 
establishment of the EMF is not within exclusive competence, as described above in the sub-
chapter 3.4. Therefore, the principle of subsidiarity applies to the proposed establishment and 
the compliance with the principle needs to be examined in detail. 
The Commission does not see any conflict in the establishment of the EMF and the principle of 
subsidiarity. According to the Commission the objectives of the regulation establishing the 
EMF cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States individually.182 Accordingly, the 
                                                 
179 Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Article 4.  
180 Article 5(3) and Article 12(b) of the TEU, Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
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Commission interprets the EU intervention in the financial assistance scheme necessary. The 
Commission claims that the objectives of the EMF can, by reason of the scale of action, be 
better achieved at Union level.183 Accordingly, the Commission construes that the EU 
intervention adds value on the matter.  
The Commission has not taken a stand on the question whether the Member States could 
achieve the objectives of the proposed Regulation collectively. The Commission has referred 
only to Member States individually and national authorities. According to the Commission, the 
Member States have difficulties in mitigating how much their own systemic risks can risk the 
financial stability of the whole Union. The Commission refers, also, to the fact that the Member 
States and their national authorities have weaker abilities to solve risks based on the cross-
border nature of the financial market. The Commission argues this with the limited scope of 
national jurisdictions.   
The Commission has based its argumentation in the issue of narrow interpretation of the phrase 
national, regional, or local level. The Commission has not taken the partly-EU-level actions 
into account. It is not evident, whether the application of the principle of subsidiarity includes 
also these partly-EU-level groups, such as euro area Member States. The estimation could cover 
the actions already taken by a group of Member States such as the ESM. Nevertheless, the 
general meaning of the words national, regional and local does not include groups consisting 
of several Member States. 
Even if the principle of subsidiarity does not include the partly-EU-level, the Commission 
should, also, compare possible Union action with the current situation. The Commission’s 
arguments seem, in a way, unsuitable, as more a suitable point of comparison can be found. 
The comparison, when the factors are the possible EMF and national instruments, leads to the 
different conclusion than the comparison when the factors are the possible EMF and the ESM. 
Arguably, the former leads to the same conclusion as the Commission had. As for the latter, the 
Commission did not evaluate the subsidiarity test, including whether the Union action is 
necessary and whether it adds value. The comparative efficiency test, whether the Union 
intervention is necessary, has strong interconnections with the requirements of the application 
of the flexibility clause. Therefore, the necessity to establish EMF is further evaluated in 
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Chapter 4.4. If the proportionality test includes the partly-EU-level, the value that the EMF 
adds, should be evaluated. 
To sum up, this chapter examined the EU’s constitutional features that effect on the 
establishment of the EMF through applying the flexibility clause. The constitutional evaluation 
of the research question primarily concerns the Union’s competence in the flexibility clause. 
The most important features of the competence in the context of the research question, 
alongside the flexibility clause, are the principle of conferral and division into different 
competence categories. The principle of conferral has significance as it is the basic principle 
behind Union competence. Not even the flexibility clause is separate from this principle. The 
categories of the competence determine whether the Union can act in a certain policy field. 
Therefore, it has relevance in the determination whether the Union can establish the EMF. The 
establishment of the EMF falls under economic policy, which limits the competence in 
coordinative measures. It is not straightforward whether the EMF would be coordinative 
measure as it has binding effect on the Member Sates’ fiscal policies, especially to the Member 
States which receive financial assistance. Also, the principle of subsidiarity must be taken into 
consideration although the role of the principle in the context of the research question is not 
straightforward. The principle of subsidiarity, however, most likely does not pose such obstacle 
to the establishment of the Emf that is impossible to overcome. 
4 THE CONDITIONS SET BY THE FLEXIBILITY CLAUSE APPLIED TO THE 
EUROPEAN MONETARY FUND 
4.1 The Flexibility clause as a test 
Despite the emphasized role of context related interpretations in the Union, the exact wording 
of the flexibility clause is also important for the interpretation. This chapter focuses on the 
linguistic interpretation of the flexibility clause. The linguistic interpretation provides important 
input for the evaluation whether the EMF can be established in the proposed form. In this 
chapter the conditions, which can be found through the linguistic interpretation of the flexibility 
clause, are examined one by one alongside with the Commission’s arguments. Especially, the 
first three paragraphs of the article 352 TFEU contain the relevant part regarding to the research 
question. Fourth paragraph of the article 352 TFEU, which is not examined further due to the 
scope of the thesis, excludes the use of the clause as a basis for common foreign and security 
policy. 
44 
 
The first paragraph of Article 352 sets out the conditions for the use of the clause and the 
procedure followed. Under the paragraph:  
If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the 
policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the 
Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the 
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the 
appropriate measures. Where the measures in question are adopted by the 
Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, it shall also act 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament. 
Before evaluating this paragraph in greater detail, the rest of the article 352 TFEU needs to be 
examined. 
The second paragraph requires monitoring of the subsidiarity principle. Under the second 
paragraph of Article 352 TFEU: 
Using the procedure for monitoring the subsidiarity principle referred to in 
Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the Commission shall draw 
national Parliaments' attention to proposals based on this Article. 
The paragraph states that legislative proposals that use the flexibility clause are under the 
subsidiarity control mechanism, under which the national parliaments are allowed monitoring 
the proposals compliance with the subsidiarity principle. The mechanism in the context of the 
establishment of the EMF is evaluated in Chapter 3.5. 
Under the third paragraph: 
Measures based on this Article shall not entail harmonisation of Member 
States' laws or regulations in cases where the Treaties exclude such 
harmonisation. 
This paragraph stipulates that flexibility clause cannot be applied to harmonize areas that are 
excluded from the harmonization. The Treaties have expressly stated certain areas where 
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harmonization is precluded.184 Also, under article 2(5) TFEU the harmonization is excluded in 
the third category of competence, under which the EU may only support, coordinate, or 
supplement the actions of the Member States.185 Economic policy and financial assistance 
mechanism is not included in these provisions. Therefore, the Treaties have not excluded the 
harmonization in the financial assistance scheme. 
The conditions set by the first paragraph, which are evaluated in this chapter in greater detail, 
are the most important feature of the flexibility clause in the context of the establishment of the 
EMF. The conditions are as follows: Firstly, the measure must be within the framework of the 
policies of the Union. Secondly, the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers to take 
the measure. Thirdly, the measure must be necessary to attain one of the objectives of the Union. 
The Union objectives can only be set by the Treaties. The last condition can be divided into two 
subsections, which are as follows: The objective must be set out in the Treaties and the measure 
must be necessary to attain it. By using the conditions as a test, it can be examined whether the 
flexibility clause can serve as legal basis for a certain measure. These conditions are evaluated 
in the next subchapters together with the evaluation whether the EMF meets these conditions. 
The proposed measure must meet all these conditions. Next, the conditions are examined each 
separately.  
4.2 Condition 1: The Treaties have not provided the necessary powers  
Under the first condition of the flexibility clause, the application of the clause is only possible 
when the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers. This condition has evolved through 
the case law. This sub-chapter examines this case law as a context for the first condition. The 
case law is examined alongside the proposed establishment of the EMF. The question whether 
the establishment of the EMF fulfils this condition, is evaluated. 
                                                 
184 The Treaty provisions that preclude harmonization are as follows: Article 19(2) TFEU, which concerns the incentive measures anti-discrimination policies; Article 79(4) TFEU, which concerns integration of immigrants; Article  84  TFEU, which concerns crime  prevention;  Article  153(2)  TFEU, which concerns social   policy   cooperation;   Articles 165(4) and 166(4) TFEU, which concerns education and  vocational training;  Article  167(5)  TFEU, which concern culture; Article 168(5) TFEU, which concern health; Article 173(2) TFEU, which concerns industry; Article 189(2) TFEU, which concerns space policy; Article 195(2) TFEU, which concerns tourism; Article 196(2) TFEU, which concerns civil protection; Article 197(2) TFEU, which concerns administrative cooperation; Article 207(6) TFEU, which concerns common commercial policy. 
185 Article 2(5) TFEU.  
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The first condition has evolved in the case law. In the early case law, the Court interpreted the 
condition broadly.186 In the Massey-Ferguson ruling the Court ruled that despite the legal bases 
that were available in the Treaty, the application of the flexibility clause was justifiable in the 
name of legal certainty.187 Therefore, the application of the flexibility clause did not require 
lack of other possible legal bases. The broad reading reflected the wider political atmosphere at 
the time.188 This was expressed in the 1972 Paris European Council, which stated that it was 
desirable to make the widest possible use of all provisions in the Treaties, including the 
flexibility clause.189 Later on, the political spirit changed and, also, the Court came into a 
conclusion that the flexibility clause can only be applied if the Treaties does not provide the 
necessary powers.190 
The first condition is quite clear in the EMF context – the Treaties do not confer a legal basis 
for the establishment of a stability mechanism such as the proposed EMF. The Treaties do refer 
to the financial assistance in the article 136 TEU. However, the article does not empower the 
Union financial assistance but financial assistance mechanism of Member States.191 This has 
been confirmed by the Court’s case law.192 The Court ruled in the Pringle case that the 
provisions of the Treaties do not confer on the Union a specific competence to establish a 
permanent stability mechanism. Therefore, the first condition is met. The Commission, as it 
states in the Proposal, agrees with the Court.193 
It is not apparent whether the Court’s ruling means that the Union does not have power to 
establish financial assistance mechanism at all. On the one hand, the ruling can be read that the 
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Court rejected the Union’s capability to establish a financial assistance instrument completely. 
This would mean that the application of the flexibility clause to establish the EMF is not 
possible. On the other hand, the ruling can be read that the Court reserved the possibility to 
integrate the financial assistance mechanism into Union framework in the future. There has 
been academic discussion on the question on the issue. According to some commentators, the 
Court rejected the Union competence to establish a permanent stability mechanism.194 Then 
again, according to others, the Pringle ruling keeps the possibility to integrate the ESM into the 
Union open.195 The Commission has come into a conclusion that the ruling didn’t take a stand 
whether the financial assistance mechanism could be established only within the Union 
framework or only outside the framework.196 Due to the lack of an authoritative statement on 
the issue, the question remains controversial. 
To sum up, the answer to the first condition is apparent and there are no necessary powers to 
establish EMF provided in the Treaties. The Pringle ruling confirms this. However, it is 
controversial whether the Court completely rejected the establishment of permanent stability 
mechanism. If the Court rejected the Union competence to establish permanent stability 
mechanism, the flexibility clause could not be applied for the establishment. 
4.3 Condition 2: The measure is within the framework of the policies of the Union 
4.3.1 The second condition in the case law and the framework of policies 
Under the second condition of the flexibility clause, the measure must be within the framework 
of the Union policies. In order to trace whether the establishment of the EMF fulfils the second 
condition the following steps needs to be taken. Firstly, the interconnected case law and the 
confirmation of the case law in the Declaration no 42 of the Treaties are examined. These 
sources provide the context for the second condition. Secondly, the boundaries of the Union 
framework of the economic policy are examined. These boundaries imply the boundaries of the 
wider framework of the policies of the Union. This wider framework consists of specific 
policies, which are, in accordance of principle of conferral, explicitly stated in the Treaties. The 
boundaries of the specific policies define the outer boundaries of the wider framework. The 
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establishment of the EMF falls within economic policy, as examined in Chapter 3.4. Therefore, 
in order to trace whether the second condition is met, the boundaries of the economic policy 
needs to be examined. Thirdly and finally, the evaluation whether the condition is met, can be 
made. 
There has been academic discussion concerning the meaning of the second condition. Some of 
the commentators have argued that the condition, which was not included in the predecessor 
forms of the flexibility clause, means that new policy areas can no longer be added by the 
flexibility clause.197 Some commentators have, however, seen the second condition simply 
implying the widened scope of the Union to other areas than the internal market.198 
The second condition is interconnected with the Court’s case law and Declaration No 42 of the 
Treaties, which repeat the case law. These sources exclude the application of the flexibility 
clause in cases where the application would lead widening the general framework of the 
Treaties. These limitations are due to the need to secure that the Treaty amendment procedure 
is followed. The Treaty amendment procedure is strict and, usually, more difficult than 
establishing secondary legislation. Treaty revision requires ratification by all Member States, 
whereas establishing a secondary legislation does not. The Court and the Member States have 
seen the preservation of the Treaty amendment procedure important, as implied in the case law 
and in the Treaty’s Declaration. The flexibility clause, therefore, cannot be used to circumvent 
the Treaty amendment procedure.  
The Court has restricted the application of the flexibility clause in the predecessor form of the 
clause. In the Opinion 2/94, the Court evaluated whether the flexibility clause could serve as 
legal basis for accession to an international treaty, the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Court ruled that the flexibility clause: 
--being integral part of an institutional system based on the principle of 
conferred powers, cannot serve as basis for widening the scope of Community 
powers beyond the general framework created by the provisions of the Treaty 
as a whole and, in particular, by those that define the tasks and the activities 
                                                 
197 Schütze (n 129) 114. 
198 Viljam Engstrom, ‘How to Tame the Elusive; Lessons from the Revision of the EU Flexibility Clause’ (2010) 7 International Organizations Law Review. 360.  
49 
 
of the Community. On any view, Article 235 cannot be used as a basis for the 
adoption of provisions whose effect would, in substance, be to amend the 
Treaty without following the procedure which it provides for that purpose.199 
The Court ruled that the flexibility clause is part of the institutional system of the Community. 
According to the Court, the institutional system is based on the principle of conferral. 
Accordingly, the principle of conferral has effect on to the application of the flexibility clause 
and the flexibility clause is not separate from the system. The Court states that the general 
framework of the Community is created by the provisions of the Treaty. When determining the 
boundaries of the framework, the provisions concerning tasks and activities of the Community 
are the most important. The Court ruled that the flexibility clause cannot be used to widen the 
scope of Community powers beyond this general framework. According to the Court, the 
flexibility clause cannot be used to adopt measures that would amend the Treaties without the 
Treaty amendment procedure. The Court argues that using the flexibility clause to widen the 
scope of competence would lead to the circumvention of the ordinary Treaty amendment 
procedure.200  
In the Opinion 2/94, the Court come into a conclusion that due to the fundamental institutional 
implications, caused by the accession to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, for Member States and for the Community would be of 
constitutional significance. Therefore, the accession would have gone beyond the scope of the 
flexibility clause and the accession required Treaty amendment.201 The Court applied 
fundamental institutional implications that have constitutional significance as factors in the 
evaluation of the question whether the measure is widening the framework. The Court applied 
these factors not only for the Union but, also, for the Member States. The Court’s ruling has 
gained some criticism. According to critics, the Court’s argumentation was a vicious circle: the 
application of the flexibility clause is unconstitutional when it goes beyond the constitution.202 
Declaration No 42 to the Treaties stipulates that the case law applies also to the current 
flexibility clause. The declaration repeats the doctrine settled in the Opinion 2/94 and states the 
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same requirements, as the Opinion 2/94, for the application of the flexibility clause. Under the 
declaration, the flexibility clause cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope of Union 
powers beyond the Union general framework. This is because the Union is based on the 
principle of conferral. As regards the determination of the framework, the declaration 
emphasizes the role of the provisions in the Treaties that define the tasks and the activities of 
the Union. Also, the declaration prohibits taking measures whose effect would, in substance, 
amend the Treaties without the Treaty amendment procedure.203 
The Opinion 2/94 and Declaration No 42 present the factors that need to be taken into 
consideration when evaluating whether the second condition is met in the proposed 
establishment of the EMF. The establishment of the EMF by applying the flexibility clause 
cannot widen the scope of Union powers beyond the general framework. The regulation 
establishing the EMF cannot amend the Treaties. If the establishment of the EMF has 
institutional implications of constitutional significance, it is likely that the general framework 
is widened. Before further evaluation of these factors in the context of the proposed 
establishment of the EMF, the framework of the economic policies of the Union is examined. 
4.3.2 Framework of the economic policy of the Union 
To find out what goes beyond the general framework of the Union, the borders of the economic 
framework needs to be determined. As determined in the case law, the framework of the 
economic policy of the Union is based on the Treaties.204 The economic policy is, as mentioned 
above in Chapter 3.4, under the additional category of competence, under which the Member 
States must coordinate their economic policies within the Union. This coordination of the 
economic policies forms the framework of the economic policy of the Union. The framework 
of the economic policy of the Union is not fully equivalent with the framework of the economic 
policy of the EMU. The euro area has accompanied the Union framework with more rules. 
As the Court determined in the Opinion 2/94, the provisions that define the tasks and the 
activities of the Union, are in a significant role when determining the boundaries of the general 
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framework. At the time of Court’s opinion, the opening provisions of the EC Treaty referred to 
these concepts. The current provisions of the Treaties, however, do not make general reference 
to tasks and activities of the Union. 205 The provisions that refer to tasks or activities do so in 
context of specific institutions. Some commentators have connected tasks and activities to 
objectives.206 This reading can be drawn from the Court’s Massey-Ferguson ruling.207 The 
Union institutions do not have similar tasks or activities than the proposed EMF would have. 
The provisions defining the tasks and activities of the Union can be accompanied with the 
provisions defining the aims and functions of the Union.208 The aims of the Union in the field 
of economic policy can be found in the general provision article 3 TEU. The aims are further 
evaluated in Chapter 4.4. As for provisions defining the functions of the Union, the Treaties 
only refer to the functions of the institutions. The institutions of the Union do not have similar 
functions than the proposed EMF would have. 
The secondary law provides more input in the determination of the boundaries of the economic 
policy of the Union. The Stability and Growth Pact provides the framework for the coordination 
of fiscal policies of the Member States. The Pact consists of rules that ensure the sound public 
policies and coordination of the fiscal policies. The Pact includes the preventive arm and the 
corrective arm, which is also referred to as the excessive deficit procedure.209 This framework 
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is accompanied in the EMU with intergovernmental Fiscal Compact. The Fiscal Compact is 
agreed on the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance.210 The Fiscal Compact 
recognizes the reinforcement of financial stability as objective, which the contracting parties 
are bound to pursue.211 The Commission has proposed that the Fiscal Compact should be 
incorporated into the Union legal framework.212 However, the Fiscal Compact has not been 
incorporated at the time of writing. 
According to the Commission, the measure for the establishment of the EMF is within the 
framework of the economic policy. According to the Proposal:  
Within the framework of the economic policy of the Union, as provided for in 
Title VIII "Economic and Monetary Policy" of Part III of the TFEU, the 
necessary powers for the Union to establish a Union body in charge of 
providing financial support for ensuring the financial stability of the euro 
area have not been enshrined. 213 
Also, the Commission refers to the Regulation (EU) No 472/2013, which the Commission 
claims to assert the Union’s competence in the area of financial assistance and the economic 
policy coordination related thereto.214 However, it is not straightforward whether this 
regulation proves that the Union has competence to establish permanent stability mechanism. 
The regulation stipulates the economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro 
area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability. 
This regulation stipulates the EU rules that govern the procedures for awarding financial 
assistance.215 However, the regulation is based on the idea that the EU is not the source of the 
financial assistance, but the Union effects on the conditions of the assistance. 
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The Commission determines the framework of economic policy through the Treaties. 
According to the Commission, a Union body in charge of providing financial support is within 
the framework of economic policy. Also, the Commission has argued that the creation of the 
EMF is within the framework of the Union policies due to the Pringle ruling.216 The Court ruled 
in the Pringle case that the ESM was under economic policy. Accordingly, other financial 
assistance mechanisms, would be under economic policy. The Commission reads that the 
establishment of the EMF is under the objectives of the Union in article 3(4) TEU.217 It is not 
straightforward, as Chapter 4.4 examines, that the article 3(4) TEU establish Union objective 
that requires the establishment of the EMF. 
The boundaries of the economic policy of the Union are defined by the Treaty provisions. 
However, these provisions do not clearly mark the boundaries. The Union framework is based 
on the Treaties and secondary law reflect the primary law. Therefore, the secondary law is 
needed to determine these boundaries. The economic policy framework includes two, partly 
overlapping and complementary, policies. The one is the economic framework for the Union 
and the another is the economic framework for the EMU. The intergovernmental solutions, 
however, do not provide input for the determination of the Union economic framework. 
4.3.3 Application of the second condition to the establishment of the European Monetary 
Fund 
The question whether the establishment of the EMF is within the framework of the policies 
defined in the Treaties, includes several aspects. The claim that the EMF would not widen the 
scope of the general framework is not straightforward. Possible problems may occur due to the 
limited character of economic policy competence. Also, the institutional implications of the 
establishment of the EMF and constitutional significance of these implications may rise the 
question of the widening of the economic framework of the Union.  
The evaluation of Treaty provisions may reveal that the establishment of the EMF oversteps 
the economic framework of the Union. The Court ruled that the Treaty provisions that concern 
the tasks and activities of the Union should be taken into consideration when determining the 
general framework. The EMF’s tasks are to mobilize funding, to provide stability support and 
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credit lines or set guarantees to the Single Resolution Board. The Treaties does not establish 
equivalent tasks to the Union. In addition, the aims and functions can be taken into 
consideration. These two additional features originate from the Commission’s statement, that 
the transfer of the EMF into the Union legal framework would not widen the scope of the 
Union’s powers. The Commission sees the transfer rather filling a cap in its specific powers 
without widening its aims, functions and activities.218 However, this is not straightforward. The 
Treaties do not establish aims, functions or activities to the Union that are fully equivalent and 
corresponding with the aims, functions and activities of the EMF. Therefore, the Commission’s 
claim that the establishment of the EMF would not widen aims, functions or activities of the 
Union, is not straightforward. 
The institutional implications of constitutional significance may incur the widening of the 
Union framework. The Court came into a conclusion in Opinion 2/94 that the constitutional 
significance caused by the institutional implications can cause that the measure would widen 
the scope of general framework. The Court included in the evaluation the institutional 
implications for both Union and Member States. The establishment of the EMF may have 
institutional implications that would have constitutional significance.  
The implications for the Union culminate in the establishment of new Union agency. The new 
Union agency would change the institutional setting in the Union. In the current mechanism, 
the Commission and the ECB have significant tasks, including the execution of the financial 
assistance, but, as the Court has ruled, they only act on behalf of the ESM.219 After the 
establishment of the EMF, not only the execution of the financial assistance, but also the 
decision-making is under the tasks of Union institution. In the Union context, the constitutional 
significance relates to the question of competence. If the establishment of the EMF oversteps 
the competence attributed to the Union and adds the competence in the field of economic policy, 
the establishment of the EMF has constitutional significance for the Union. However, the 
establishment of the EMF through secondary legislation, as stated in the case law and 
Declaration no 42 of the Treaties and principle of conferral, cannot add new competence to the 
Union. Therefore, if the EMF widens the scope of competence, it does not fulfil the second 
condition of the flexibility clause. 
                                                 
218 European Commission (n 176). 
219 Ledra (n 234). 
55 
 
In addition, the constitutional significance for the Member States should be examined as the 
Court tested it in the Opinion 2/94. It is possible, that establishment of the EMF has 
constitutional significance to the Member States as the EMF would be binding Union agency 
armed with powers to grant financial assistance with strict conditions. The constitutional 
significance would be directed to the economic sovereignty of the Member States, which is 
examined in detail in Chapter 5.3.  
The Member States are required to coordinate their economic policies. This coordinative 
character may be overstepped in the establishment of the EMF due to the impacts on the 
macroeconomic policies of the Member States that receive financial assistance. The financial 
assistance functions are problematic as the financial assistance packages are tied to strict 
macroeconomic conditions. The packages require austerity economic policy and have strict and 
specific conditions. These may exceed the common objectives and responsibilities determined 
in the Stability and Growth Pact. The economic framework of the Union includes 
macroeconomic surveillance tools and a macroeconomic imbalance procedure, but then again, 
the strict and detailed macroeconomic conditions tied to the financial assistance seem to go 
beyond the macroeconomic framework of the Union. The intensity and breadth of the rescue 
packages may imply the widening of the economic framework. 
In conclusion, it is not straightforward whether the establishment of the EMF is within the 
framework of the Union policies. The most significant factors in the application of the second 
condition, the measure being within the framework of the Union policies, culminates in the 
Union framework of economic policies and its boundaries. The establishment of the EMF may 
overstep these boundaries by involving more than coordinative measures. Also, the 
establishment of the EMF may have constitutional significance caused by the institutional 
implications, and, therefore, it is not evident whether the flexibility clause can serve as legal 
basis for the establishment of the EMF. 
4.4 Condition 3: Necessary to attain one of the objectives of the Union 
4.4.1 Financial stability as objective 
Under the article 352 TFEU the measure can be taken if it is necessary to attain one of the 
objectives set out in the Treaties. The possible lack in Union objectives Stated in the Treaties 
does not necessarily mean that the objective could not be pursued through Union actions. 
56 
 
However, the flexibility clause will not be able to serve as legal basis if the measure is not 
necessary to attain a Treaty objective. The question is whether the EMF fulfils this condition. 
The examination of the objective of the EMF and examining whether this objective is, also, a 
Union objective, provide an answer to the question.220  
According to the Commission, the objective of the EMF is the financial stability. The proposal 
states that the EMF’s objective is to contribute to safeguarding the financial stability of the 
euro area, as well as the financial stability of the 'participating Member States'.221 The 
objective of the EMF includes reducing risks to financial stability.222 However, the Treaties do 
not state financial stability as Union objective. The flexibility clause cannot be used to create 
any new objectives.223 It is not stipulated, however, that the objective should be stated explicitly. 
The Court has ruled, in the context of the flexibility clause, that the Treaties may express an 
implicit underlying objective.224 This provides some leeway and discretion in the interpretation 
of the Treaty objectives.225  
For the evaluation of the objective, it is necessary to know what financial stability means. The 
notion of financial stability is not explained in the Treaties. Therefore, the usual meaning of the 
notion provides help for the determination. Financial stability can refer to the functioning of the 
financial system including financing through markets and indirect financing through 
intermediaries.226 Therefore, financial stability is broader than the concept of the banking 
stability, which refers to the capacity of the banking sector to fulfill its role in the economy. 
Financial stability can, simply, also refer to a situation where there are no excessive volatility, 
stress or crises in the market. Then again, according to some commentators, the financial 
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stability requires more than these negative instability factors.227 As for some of the 
commentators, financial stability represents a situation where regular shocks to the system 
cannot cause a financial crisis.228 The European Central Bank has defined financial stability as 
being a condition where the financial system is capable of standing shocks and financial 
imbalances.229 In summary, the notion is not always determined consistently.230 Despite the 
unestablished determination231 of the notion, it is frequently used in the Union context. For 
example, the ECB review the financial stability of the euro area and the Commission has a 
directorate-general focusing on financial stability among financial services and capital markets. 
As the Court have ruled that the Treaty provisions may express implicit underlying objectives, 
financial stability could also be implied in other Treaty provisions. The Court has found that 
measures found through application of the flexibility clause may act for the achievement of 
these implicit underlying objectives.232 The general provision of the objectives, article 3 TEU, 
is widely worded and other Treaty provisions define the contents of these objectives.233 It could 
be possible that these general objectives include financial stability as implicit objective. 
According to some commentators, financial stability is implicit part of the Union objectives of 
sustainable development of Europe, based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a 
highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress.234 
However, distinguishing arguments can be made. For example, Constitutional Law Committee 
of Finnish Parliament has stated that the general provision of the objectives does not allow the 
extensive use of that provision in the economic policy. This is, also, related to the limited 
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competence in the field of economic policy.235 Therefore, the Constitutional Law Committee 
of Finnish Parliament would not, most likely, interpret the general provision including other 
objectives. 
At least financial stability is closely related to these objectives. Especially, the internal market 
and EMU have strong interconnections with the financial stability. The ECB’s tasks are related 
to the financial stability. The Treaties define the stability of the financial system as objective of 
European Central Bank and the European System of Central Banks.236 It is not straightforward 
whether the stability of the financial system and financial stability are equivalent.  Also, the 
ECB’s competence and tasks, as monetary institution, differ from the proposed EMF. The EMF 
is proposed to provide financial assistance. On the contrary, direct lending to the Member States 
is prohibited from the ECB.237 
Also, the frequent use of the notion of financial stability in the Union context may imply its 
establishment as Union objective. For example, the ECB publishes annual Financial Stability 
Review and the Commission has Directorate-General concerning financial stability issues238. It 
has been argued that the financial crisis revealed the financial stability as overriding objective, 
which EU’s economic policies are expected to serve. 239 This could apply, at least, within the 
EMU.240 
The Court has touched on the topic. In the Pringle ruling the Court seemed to suggest that 
Eurozone pursues a new objective of the stability.241 However, this was not stated explicitly. 
The Court ruled in Ledra case that ensuring the stability of the banking system of the euro area 
as a whole is an objective of general interest pursued by the EU.242 However, the stability of 
the banking system and the financial stability are not wholly corresponding. All in all, the Court 
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has not directly interpreted that the financial stability is a Union objective. The fact, that the 
euro area Member States see the stability as objective for them, does not mean that the objective 
would automatic be Union objective. 
The Union publications have discussed the position of the financial stability. Even though the 
Union institutions frequently use the notion of financial stability and refer to it, the statements 
that directly address the position of financial stability deny it being under Union’s 
responsibility. The Four President’s Report from 2012 stated that the financial stability is under 
national responsibilities. The Report, nevertheless, saw this problematic and paved the way for 
integration.243 However, no such exact integration has been established.244 
The Commission has not seen this as a problem for the establishment of the EMF. The 
Commission sees the financial stability as implicit objective of the general objectives stated in 
the article 3 TEU. The Commission refers to the paragraphs 3(3) and 3(4) TEU, which state 
objectives related to the internal market and EMU. According to the Commission, the 
establishment of the EMF is necessary to attain the objectives of establishing the EMU and to 
attain the sustainable development of Europe. Also, according to the Commission, safeguarding 
the financial stability aims at achieving a deeper, fairer and more resilient EMU.245 However, 
it is not evident whether the link between financial stability and explicitly stated Union 
objectives is close enough to the financial stability to be also Union objective.  
As the Commission evaluates the third condition, it focuses arguing the necessity of the 
measure, not the status of the financial stability as objective. However, the arguments are 
reserve closer look as they provide input for the evaluation of the financial stability as Treaty 
objective. According to the Commission, the necessity of having a Union body safeguarding 
the stability of the euro area is based on factual elements. The Commission finds these factual 
elements illustrated in article 136(3) TFEU and second recital of the ESM Treaty. 246 Under 
article 136(3) TFEU, the Member States whose currency is euro may establish a stability 
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mechanism. The article states that the mechanism can be activated if it is indispensable to 
safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The Article does not mention that this would 
be EU’s objective. On the contrary, the Court have ruled in the Pringle that the third paragraph 
of article 136 TEU did not establish any legal basis for the Union to be able to undertake any 
action that was not possible before the amendment of the third paragraph.247 This is important, 
as the third paragraph is the only Treaty provision explicitly concerning financial stability. The 
Court have ruled that the Treaty provisions can express implicit underlying objectives.248 When 
interpreting this alongside the Pringle ruling, it appears that the third paragraph of article 136 
TEU cannot alone establish implicit underlying objective of financial stability. The second 
recital of the ESM Treaty refers to the article 136(3) TFEU. It is notable that the ESM Treaty 
is intergovernmental Treaty, and it cannot establish or influence on the establishment of Union 
objectives. 
To sum up, there are several points favoring the financial stability as Treaty objective and 
several points that could exclude the financial stability from Treaty objectives. The most 
significant reasoning concerns the general Treaty objectives implying the financial stability. 
This is the reasoning that the Commission favors in its proposal. This interpretation may be 
correct due to the case law recognizing the possibility to Treaty provisions establish implicit 
underlying objectives, the deep interconnections between the expressly stated objectives and 
the financial stability and the frequent use of the financial stability in the Union context. 
However, there are also arguments against the financial stability being implicit objective in the 
Treaties. The Union authorities have expressed that financial stability is in the responsibilities 
of the Member States, but integration in the field is wanted. However, no such integration has 
been established and the flexibility clause cannot be used to establish any new objectives. 
Therefore, in accordance with the principle of conferral, the establishment of the EMF cannot 
establish the financial stability as new objective. It remains controversial, whether the financial 
stability is a Union objective established in the Treaties. 
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4.4.2 Necessity 
Under the third condition the measure must be necessary to attain the objectives of the Union. 
In the evaluation of the necessity rule, the case law on the issue, academic discussions and 
Commission’s arguments needs to be examined. The case law related to the necessity rule is 
read broadly and not limited to the case law concerning the flexibility clause. Therefore, the 
interconnections with necessity in other provisions and principles are taken into consideration. 
The academic commentators have divided the third condition in two questions. These two 
questions are evaluated. Finally, the evaluation whether the establishment of the EMF fulfils 
the third condition, can be made. 
The necessity test has interconnections with two common principles of the Union, the principle 
of subsidiarity and the principle of proportionality. The principle of subsidiarity has been 
evaluated above in Chapter 3.5. As stated in that chapter, the subsidiarity test includes the 
comparative efficiency test under which the necessity of the measure should be examined. 
Under the debate about the European Convention, the necessity test under the principle of 
subsidiarity and the necessity test under the flexibility clause were connected. The working 
group of the European Convention stated that the necessity test under the flexibility clause 
should include evaluation whether the satisfactory result may not be achieved through national 
action.249 However, the Draft Treaty was rejected, and, therefore, the statement of the working 
group can only be used as indicative help for interpretation.250 Under the principle of 
proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the Treaties.251 Even though the point of reference in these necessity 
tests varies, the necessity check serves multiple purposes.  
The Court has tested the necessity more frequently in the context of the principle of 
proportionality than the flexibility clause. Despite the different angle in the proportionality 
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examination compared with the flexibility test, as the proportionality often functions as a 
balancing test between competing principles252, it provides input in the determination of the 
notion of necessity. However, it should be kept in mind, that the resemblance between these 
two necessity tests is only partial.253 The Court has found in its settled case law that 
proportionality test includes, among other steps, the determination whether the measure taken 
is necessary in order to achieve the objective.254 This has strong interconnections with the 
necessity test required in the application of the flexibility clause. Also, some commentators 
understood that the case law rules that the proportionality test requires, among others, the 
necessity test, which evaluates the necessity of the measure to achieve the desired objective.255 
The necessity step corresponds with the third condition of the flexibility clause. 
The Court have evaluated the necessity test and have quashed Union measures based on the 
test. It should, however, to be acknowledged that the proportionality test has no straightforward 
or established substantial meaning in the EU law.256 Also, the proportionality test differs 
depending on the issue. The Court has often applied the so-called manifestly disproportionate 
test for the Union measures. As for the Member States’ measures, the Court has often applied 
different versions of the so-called least restrictive means test. The least restrictive means test 
can be understood as one form of the necessity test.257 The cases where a Union measure is 
quashed on the basis of necessity, have varied. For example, in early case law, Skimmed milk 
cases, the Court found that the regulation concerned was not necessary in order to attain the 
desired objective.258 Also, the Court have struck down an EU measures more recently. The 
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Court ruled in ABNA Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for Health and Food Standards Agency 
that Union measure was not necessary to attain the desired objective.259 The Court has based its 
evaluation in these cases on factual elements. 
The Commission has, in the Proposal, argued that the EMF is necessary. The necessity, 
according to the Commission, is based on factual elements. The Commission refers to Article 
136(3) TEU and the second recital of the ESM Treaty as proofs of these factual elements. 
Article 136(6) stipulates that the Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a 
stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area 
as a whole. According to the second recital of the ESM Treaty, the ESM is a stability 
mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area 
as a whole. The Commission states that the establishment of the EMF is necessary to contribute 
to the safeguarding of the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, its Member States and 
the non-euro Member States which participate in the Banking Union. Accordingly, the 
Commission understands that the establishment of the ESM is actual proof of it being necessary. 
However, these arguments are not watertight. It is not evident that the Union could use an 
international Treaty, the ESM Treaty, as a reasoning for its own actions. Then again, even 
though the financial assistance mechanism could be necessary, it does not mean that it is 
necessary to have it within the Union legal system.  
One of the aspects the Commission observes is the participation of the non-euro Member States 
that participate in the European System of Central Banks, to the financial assistance mechanism. 
The parties of the ESM Treaty, as the ESM Treaty and article 136(6) TEU states, include only 
the euro area Member States. According to the Commission it is necessary to include also the 
non-euro Members in the financial assistance mechanism. However, it is not straightforward 
whether this is necessary. One of the factors that should be taken into consideration is that the 
non-euro Member States react differently for the unstable financial system. For example, the 
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risk of contagion of financial crisis is higher within the area of single currency than in the non-
euro area.260 The mandatory participating into financial assistance mechanism needs more 
evaluation. However, the matter is not discussed here further due to the limited nature of the 
thesis. 
Under academic discussion, the necessity condition is shaped into two questions: Firstly, has 
one of the objectives of the Treaties not been fully or satisfactorily attained? Secondly, can the 
Union institutions correct the situation by exercising a power?261 To establish EMF as proposed, 
the answer to the first question should be negative and the answer to the second question should 
be positive. The necessity condition and its sub questions in the context of the EMF are as 
follows. First question is whether the financial stability is fully or satisfactorily attained? 
Answering the question requires measuring the state of financial stability. The question 
connects with the nature of the financial assistance mechanisms being crisis preparedness 
institutions. The question whether the financial stability is not fully or satisfactorily attained in 
the current economic environment should be accompanied with the question whether the 
financial stability can be fully or satisfactorily attained even at the peak of financial crisis. The 
second question is whether the Union institutions can correct the situation. It is not 
straightforward that the answers to these questions are yes.  
Answering the first question, whether the financial stability has not fully or satisfactorily been 
attained, the status of the current state of financial stability needs to be measured. However, the 
measuring is not an easy task. The issue how the financial stability should be measured has 
been under academic debate. The Central Banks have, also, joined in the debate. To begin with, 
the financial stability is a fluid state of economy depending on various factors, which makes 
the measuring of the financial stability difficult. It is a lot easier to measure financial stability 
after a crisis, on an ex post basis, but measuring a current state of stability is not that simple.262  
The Financial Stability Reports, published by Central Banks, usually focuses only on a few key 
indicators.263 The financial stability studies often measure the traditional financing market 
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leaving the so-called shadow-banking sector without a closer look.264 Comparing different 
reports is not an easy task, either. The reports emphasize different factors. There is no single 
measure that every report would make use of and it is not likely that such measure would be 
established due to the difficulties of establishing such measure. Most of the obstacles that make 
the establishment of such measure improbable are connected to the complexity of the financial 
system and the links between different sectors. Also, different countries have different risks and 
factors.265 The European Central Bank has focused in its Financial Stability Review in 
identifying and prioritizing the main sources of systemic risks and vulnerabilities to the euro 
area financial system. Notably, the scope of the ECB’s report has been only the euro area, not 
the Union area.266  
The nature of financial assistance mechanisms being crisis preparedness instruments adds the 
complexity of the issue. The measuring report that states that current state of financial stability 
is satisfactorily attained, does not fully respond to the objective of the financial assistance 
mechanism. The financial assistance mechanisms aim safeguarding the financial stability also 
in the event of crisis. Therefore, the financial stability measurements should include the 
evaluation of the capacity of the financial system to withstand risks. The difficulties of 
measuring the state of financial stability complicate the examination whether the financial 
stability is satisfactorily attained. The methods of measuring the financial stability require 
further evaluation, which cannot be made here due to the wide, complex nature of the issue. 
The answer to the second question, whether the Union action would correct the situation, is not 
evident, either. Since the financial assistance mechanism, the ESM, already exists and it would 
remain considerably similar after transformation to EMF, it is not straightforward whether the 
establishment of the EMF would be necessary. The earlier academic debates before the 
Commission’s proposal, being speculative in nature, denied the necessity of the EMF in the 
basis of the existence of International Monetary Fund. The need for European mechanism, 
according to some commentators, is due to the limited resources of the IMF.267 When the 
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existence of distinct institution would mean that European mechanism is unnecessary, the 
existence of basically similar mechanism, with the same tasks, scope and objectives, could also 
preclude the fulfilment of the necessity condition. Arguably, when there already is an 
instrument, the necessity to establish a new one is not by no means self-evident.268  
The Commission did not explain explicitly, in the proposal, why it sees the transfer necessary. 
The Commission, however, explains why it has chosen a Council Regulation to the instrument: 
The Commission states that the EMF, within the Union framework, has to be binding in its 
entirety and directly applicable in Member States.269 The current mechanism is not legally 
binding in a sense that it only involves Member States that have signed and ratified the ESM 
Treaty. But, after a state has ratified the ESM Treaty, it is no longer voluntary.270 
One aspect in the evaluation of the question whether the transfer into the Union framework is 
necessary, is related to the credibility of the current system. Notably, even the existence of a 
credible system may prevent financial crisis. Therefore, if the ESM is not credible enough, the 
establishment of the EMF is necessary. The credibility depends on, at least, three factors. The 
mechanism must be financially adequate for not only small Member States, but also for bigger 
Member States, such as Italy or Spain, too. The financial assistance mechanism is only credible 
if all Member States support it politically. Also, the conditions of the financial assistance must 
be acceptable for the receiving Member States. The lack of political will for economic reforms 
required would torpedo the rescue package. These requirements for the credibility of the 
mechanism consider both, the ESM and the EMF. If the ESM is not credible, the establishment 
of the EMF can be understood as necessary. However, if the establishment would not improve 
the credibility of the mechanism, the credibility evaluation does not provide fulfilment of the 
necessity condition. 
To sum up this sub-chapter, it is not straightforward whether the third condition is met. It is not 
certain whether the financial stability is a Union objective. The financial stability can be implicit 
underlying objective of the Treaties. At least it has deep interconnections with the Treaty 
objectives. If the financial stability is not a Treaty objective, the third condition is not met. Then 
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again, if it is a Treaty objective, the necessity test still needs to be examined. It is not certain, 
either, whether the establishment of the EMF is necessary. The necessity depends on whether 
the already existing ESM is taken into consideration. As the ESM already exist, and it is 
equivalent with the proposed EMF, the necessity test should consider whether the transfer into 
the Union framework is necessary, not whether the stability mechanism is necessary in the first 
place. 
In conclusion to this chapter, it is possible that the conditions set on the application of the 
flexibility clause are not met. The first condition, which stipulates that the Treaties have not 
provided the necessary powers, is the easiest to meet. However, not even that condition is 
straightforward. The issues related to the first condition culminate in the issue whether the 
competence to establish EMF is excluded. The second condition, which stipulates that the 
measure must be within the framework of Union policies, is complex. The framework of 
economic policies does not have clear boundaries, and therefore, it is not easy to determine 
when exactly the boundaries are crossed. The third condition, whether the measure is necessary 
to attain one of the Treaty objectives, is the most complex condition of these three. It is not 
evident whether the financial stability is a Treaty objective or whether the transfer into the 
Union legal framework is necessary as the ESM already exists. If the EMF is wanted to establish 
through applying the flexibility clause, these conditions needs to be met. Therefore, the possible 
issues should be reviewed and overcome. 
5 UNION COMPETENCE GIVEN BY THE MEMBER STATES IN THEIR 
CONSTITUTIONS 
5.1 The significance of national constitutions in the competence 
The constitutions of Member States effect on the establishment of the EMF. It is possible that 
the Union law accepts the establishment of the EMF, but the constitutions of Member States 
prohibit it. In practice, if the establishment of the flexibility clause is in breach of its 
constitution, the Member States representative in the Council is not likely agreeing for taking a 
Council regulation on the establishment of the EMF. Taking a measure through the application 
of the flexibility clause requires the unanimity of the Council, and the Member States’ stand on 
the issue have a huge practical impact on the possibilities to establish the EMF as proposed. 
Therefore, it is important to evaluate the research question, also, in the perspective of the 
constitutions of Member States. In this chapter, the relation between national constitutions and 
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the Union competence is examined. If the research question is only studied on the perspective 
of the Union law, the examination falls short of the desired. This first sub-chapter focuses on 
the relation between the Union law and Member States’ laws. The second subchapter focuses 
on the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz, which means competence to determine competence, 
and its aspects. In the third sub-chapter, the sovereignty in the field of economic policy is 
evaluated. All these themes are interpreted in the perspective of the establishment of the EMF.  
The Constitution of Finland and the Constitution of Germany, which is called Basic Law, are 
used here as examples. In both these Member States the constitution is high authority in political 
and legal culture. 271 The rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany272 and 
statements of Constitutional Law Committee of Finnish Parliament illustrate the constitutions 
of their States. The status of these national institutions are different from each other. The Federal 
Constitutional Court examines matters retrospectively whereas the Constitutional Law 
Committee concerns issues handed to it before a measure is taken.273 Germany has quite 
extensive case law in the area. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has interpreted the 
relation between the Basic Law and EU law several times.274 The relationship with the Federal 
Constitutional Court and the CJEU275 has not always been straightforward276 and the Federal 
Constitutional Court represents, at least to some extent, a stricter stand than some of the other 
national constitutional courts of Member States277.  
The CJEU has constantly ruled that the Union law and national laws represent different bodies 
and that they are distinct and separate278. However, the relation between the national 
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constitutions and EU constitution is not straightforward.279 The source of legitimation comes 
from Member States’ constitution. The Member States are, in principle and primarily, 
sovereign. The competence is attributed to the Union by the operation of national constitutions. 
Therefore, the Union law is justified from the national constitutions, not the other way 
around.280 From the Union point of view, the principle of conferral implies this need for 
legitimation. As for Member States’ point of view, the legitimacy of the EU is based on the 
functional and limited chains of delegation by the Member States to the EU.281 The need for 
national level legitimation is constant and is not limited to the time of joining the EU and signing 
the accession Treaty.282  
The idea of functional and limited delegation chains is in some cases overly black-and-white. 
The view that emphasizes the outcome and objectives, which the flexibility clause represents, 
complicates the basic idea of the functional and limited delegations of competence from 
Member States to the Union. In some cases, the principle of conferral and the efficiency are in 
conflict between each other. The conflict appears when the objectives of the Union can only be 
achieved by non-functional and unlimited way, which is based on values. In the context of the 
establishment of the EMF, this means that the Union acts, in a way, in grey area. It may be 
necessary, to attain the objective of financial stability, to use the flexibility clause to take 
measures. The application of the flexibility clause may mean acting beyond the functional and 
limited competence.283 This leads to a situation where the Member States no longer has those 
functional and limited chains of delegation and the Union acts on based more open-ended 
powers. If the EU oversteps explicitly the powers attributed to it, the national legitimation can 
be lost.284  
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Then again, the Union legal system itself may represent a threat to the legitimation chains. The 
CJEU has, in its case law, emphasized the Union’s role as a new legal order.285 Through this 
notion, the Court has argued that when the competence attributions are sufficient, and in certain 
in nature, the Union’s jurisdiction starts to live its own life. This own life of the EU law is 
considered independent from the Member States will.286 However, this argumentation is, to 
some extent, in conflict with the idea of Union based on the division of competence and 
principle of conferral. 
Despite the ex-ante perspective of the proposed EMF in the thesis, the ex post perspective 
presents relevant aspects to the relation between the Member States’ constitutions and the 
Union constitution. The national courts hold a significant role in the Union law enforcement. 
The national courts remain actors and they resolve cases that arise before them and involve a 
conflict between the EU law and national law.287 The national courts hold the power to decide 
which cases to refer to the CJEU. The national courts and the CJEU share a function and sharing 
of a function leads to sharing a power, too.288 The CJEU holds the power of interpretation 
whereas the national courts hold the power of application.289 The national courts not only apply 
the Union law into the cases, but also interpret the national constitution. The national courts 
hold the power to interpret the provisions of national constitutions that concern the power 
delegations to the Union. Within the limits of these provisions, the national courts may interpret 
cases concerning the extent of the competence attributed to the Union. The case law of the 
German Constitutional Court is a good example of drawing the line between the question which 
instance, national or the Union, should rule the case. 290 The law enforcement illustrates the 
                                                 Constitucional have not, however, stated whether it would be competent to judge the possible infringements of the national constitution and the lack of acceptability of the attributions. This would be under discussion in the context of the establishment of the EMF. Declaration of the Tribunal Constitucional DTC 1/2004 of 13 December 2004, paragraph 2. 
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289 This origins from the Court’s case law, see. e.g. Costa v Enel (n 113) para 1; judgement of 8 February 1990, Staatssecretaris van Financiën v Shipping and Forwarding Enterprise Safe BV, C-320/88, EU:C:1990:61, paragraph 11. 
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importance of national constitutions when determining the boundaries of the Union 
competence. 
The influence of the Member States’ constitution and Union constitution is two-way. Clearly, 
the Union law contributes to the national laws. The Union law is, under the principle of primacy, 
superior to the national law, including the constitutions. The influence is, however, also 
opposite. The national constitutions can contribute to the interpretation of the Union law. This, 
at least partly, follows from the expansion of the notion of constitutional identity.291 The 
concept is based on article 4(2) TEU, under which the Union must respect Member States’ 
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional. The 
Court has also noticed the concept, although, it has not interpreted it directly.292 The Court has 
taken national constitutions into account.293 The fundamental constitutional principles common 
to all Member States have more important role when interpreting open-ended provisions, such 
as the flexibility clause, than regular provisions. 294 This can partly be because of the amount of 
discretion in the open-ended provisions. In the context of the establishment of the EMF, this 
relates to the sovereignty of Member States in the field of economic policy. The sovereignty of 
economic policy is a common principle to all Member States. It remains open, whether the 
Union should take this into account when proposing new measures under the flexibility clause. 
To sum up, the research question cannot be studied without taking the Member States’ 
perspective into account. The Union is based on the competence attributed by the Member 
States. Therefore, the legitimation of the Union comes from the Member States. The Member 
States justify the power transfer in functional and limited delegation chains. However, the 
boundaries and limitations of this attributed competence are not always straightforward. The 
national authorities have a role in the determination of the competence they have attributed. 
Therefore, the national constitutions and the statements of the authorities interpreting them 
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needs to be examined in order to find out whether the flexibility clause can be applied as the 
legal basis for the establishment of the EMF. 
5.2 The notion of Kompetenz-kompetenz 
5.2.1 The prohibition of self-conferral 
National constitutions have restrictions on the powers that are possible to transfer to the Union. 
These restrictions effect on the Member States’ interpretation whether the Union oversteps its 
competence. If it is prohibited in the first place from the Member State to confer the powers 
needed to the establishment of a measure, the Member States’ authorities most likely interpret 
that this certain measure oversteps the Union competence. These restrictions are often described 
through the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz, which describes the competence to determine 
competence. The doctrine is established in its German phrasing also in the Union context. The 
doctrine is discussed not only in literature but also in German case law. There are, at least, two 
aspects in the kompetenz-kompetenz that effect on the establishment of the EMF. These aspects 
are the question of possible self-conferral and the question of the authority to decide the 
boundaries of the competence.295 These aspects are deeply interrelated. The question of the self-
conferral is examined first before moving forward to examine the question of the authority to 
determine the boundaries of the competence. 
Kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine prohibits self-conferral. The self-conferral means a situation 
when a subject of the power delegation could determine its powers. Some of the Member States 
have stated this explicitly in their constitutions or the constitutional case law.296 In the Union 
context, this means a situation when the EU or its institution could determine its powers and 
even add those powers without delegation from the sources of these powers, which are the 
Member States.297 The flexibility clause may imply self-conferral, if the Union can, by using 
the clause, create new powers.298 The prohibition of the self-conferral explains the problematic 
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nature of the establishment of the EMF, where the legal basis, claimed by the Commission, is 
vague. The notion of self-conferral is related to the ban on transferring blank empowerments, 
which is represented in some of the Member States’ constitutions. The ban prohibits the national 
authorities attributing all-embracing powers to the EU.299 
Throughout the history of integration, there have been concerns that discretionary powers, such 
as the flexibility clause, represent a threat to the sovereign rights of Member States.300 The has 
been seen problematic especially in the German jurisdiction. The German Constitutional Court 
has tested the flexibility clause and the kompetenz-kompetenz, which has concerned the question 
whether the Union has competence to decide and change its own legal competence. 301 It ruled 
that the EU integration could only be taken through German Basic Law procedures. Because of 
the kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine, the Union cannot independently amend the foundations of 
the Union and the Treaties.302 According to the Constitutional Court of Germany, the ultimate 
kompetenz-kompetenz to decide whether the Union action is within the scope of the Union 
competence belongs to itself.303 
However, there are also arguments denying the self-conferral of the Union through the 
flexibility clause. According to some commentators, applying kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine 
into the Union jurisdiction is not straightforward. The Union is based on enumerated powers. 
Accordingly, as some commentators have stated, the flexibility clause is not meant to function 
as self-conferral. This is because the flexibility clause does not entitle the Union to create or 
expand attributed powers. Instead of creating powers, the clause creates new Union law.304 The 
clause can be used to put powers that already exist in the Treaties into concrete form.305 Also, 
the clause cannot entitle the Union to create new objectives or modify the scope of the existing 
objectives of the Union.306 Therefore, the commentators have seen that the flexibility clause 
does not provide self-conferral. 
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The impact of the self-conferral doctrine on the research question is not straightforward. The 
possible self-conferral, that the flexibility clause may represent, causes problems to the national 
justification. It is possible, that the establishment of the EMF is possible through the EU law, 
but in breach of the prohibition of self-conferral, and, therefore, in breach of some of the 
Member States’ laws. Also, the self-conferral in the flexibility clause could be in breach of the 
EU law as it can violate the principle of conferral. However, as the prohibition of self-conferral 
represents mostly an abstract and theoretical determination of the Union competence, the actual 
recourse to the self-conferral is not likely. The significance of the self-conferral doctrine in the 
research question, consequently, is based on the explanatory effect of the controversial nature 
of the flexibility clause. Another side of the kompetenz-kompetenz, the authority to determine 
the boundaries of the Union competence, has more practical importance on the issue. 
5.2.2 Authority to decide the boundaries of the Union competence 
Another aspect of the kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine, alongside the self-conferral, is the 
question who has the authority to decide the boundaries of the Union competence.307 There are 
two, rival, candidates on the issue. Firstly, the Member States could hold the authority to decide 
the boundaries of their power attributions. Under the principle of conferral, the Union only has 
the powers that the Member States has conferred to it.308 Accordingly, it would be logical that 
the Member States and their constitutional courts would define the contents of the conferred 
competence. Secondly, the CJEU could have the competence to determine the boundaries of 
the competence. According to the Treaties, the Court has the authority to determine all issues 
involving the interpretation and application of the Treaties.309 Therefore, as the competence is 
determined in the Treaties, the Court could hold the authority to determine the boundaries of 
the Union competence. These rival candidates have both relevant arguments in favor of their 
authority.  
The Court has favored its authority to decide the boundaries of the competence as it is the final 
interpreter of the EU law. There are certain reasons why the Court has favored its own 
jurisdiction. The Court has the authority to determine all issues involving interpretation and 
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application of the Treaties. Also, the Court has jurisdiction to review the legality of legislative 
acts and other acts of the Union institutions. 310 The Courts role as Treaty interpretation may 
imply the powers to define the limits of the Union’s competence.311 The competence is 
determined in the Treaties. Accordingly, when the Court is determining the boundaries of the 
competence it is interpreting the Treaties. Also, as widely accepted, the uniform application of 
the Union law throughout the Member States requires that one institution has the power to 
secure the uniform application. The Courts authority, confirmed by the Treaties, implies with 
the Member States’ intention to secure the uniform application.312 Furthermore, the Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction to invalidate the acts of the Union.313 This means that no other institution 
has the power to invalidate the Union measures based on the overstepping of the competence. 
This includes the national authorities of the Member States such as the constitutional courts. 
This can imply the power to determine the boundaries of the competence.314 Justifiably, it would 
be impractical if the authority to decide the boundaries of the Union competence would belong 
to a party that does not have power to apply this authority in Union measures that overstep the 
competence. 
However, also the national authorities have relevant factors in their favor. The possible national 
authorities include authorities to interpret national constitutions, such as constitutional courts 
and parliamentary constitutional committees. Institutions interpreting the national constitutions 
have seen that they hold powers to determine what competence the Member State concerned 
has attributed.315 This is mostly because of the national constitutions, which have different 
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provisions and principles in different Member States concerning the limitations of the power 
attributions. For example, according to the Constitutional Court of Germany, it possesses the 
ultimate kompetenz-kompetenz and the authority to determine the boundaries of the Union 
competence. It states that, under the Basic Law, it is prohibited to confer authority to determine 
the boundaries of the competence to the Union. It claims that the EU or institutions created in 
connection with it cannot hold the kompetenz-kompetenz.316 Also, it has claimed in its order for 
reference in the Gauweiler case that it has the right and even duty to examine the ultra vires 
questions of the EU actions.317 
Even though the Member States interpret their own constitutions and not the Union law, the 
Union law may seem to support the Member States’ authority. The Union is based on the 
principle of conferral, and it would be logical that the actors of the power delegations could 
determine the contents of these delegations. 
The starting points of the argumentation of the rival candidates are different. The Court sees 
the overstepping of Union competence violation of the Treaties. The Court reads that 
overstepping of the competence when establishing the EMF as proposed would be a Council’s 
breach of the Treaties. At the point of view of the national constitutions, the overstepping of 
the Union competence is in the breach of the Accession Treaty and national constitution. The 
national constitutional authorities would see the establishment of the EMF, if it overstepped the 
competence conferred to the Union, as a breach of their own constitutions. Therefore, the Court 
and national authorities see the subject of the violation differently. 
The nature of the flexibility clause as open-ended provision has given rise to the establishment 
of national proceedings. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has ruled that the 
establishment of a measure under the flexibility clause requires national, parliamentary voting. 
According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the vote is required due to the possible 
amendments to the foundations of the EU and the lack of participation of legitimate legislative 
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bodies.318 The need for the vote originates from the Basic Law.319 Also, the Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled that the German representative in the Council is not entitled to 
express the formal approval on behalf of Germany.320 The establishment of Council regulation 
through application of the flexibility clause requires unanimity of the Council, and, therefore, 
the Court’s ruling is significant. The German representative cannot, because of the requirement 
of parliamentary voting, himself decide, even after consultation, the German’s stand on a 
measure. Also, other Member States have proceedings for the cases where the flexibility clause 
is cited as a legal basis for a measure.321 The proceedings may include testing the conditions 
that have been evaluated in Chapter 4.322 
The doctrine of supremacy could seem to favor the Courts jurisdiction regarding the matter. 
Under this doctrine, any norm of Union law, including the case law of the CJEU, takes 
precedence over any provision of national law, including the constitutions and national courts 
are required to give direct effect to the Union law.323 However, the principle of conferral limits 
the supremacy. The Union law is superior to all national law, but the supremacy extends no 
further than the scope of the powers that Member States have chosen to confer on the Union.324 
Therefore, the supremacy does not provide a simple answer to the question of the boundaries 
of the competence. This is exemplified in the case law of The Constitutional Court of Germany. 
It has not accepted the supremacy of the EU law without exceptions. According to the 
Constitutional Court of Germany, the boundaries of the competence limit the supremacy.325 
Therefore, it is not straightforward that the doctrine of primacy would lead into a conclusion 
that the Union case law concerning the boundaries of the competence overrules the national 
interpretations of the contents of the conferred powers. 
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Some of the commentators have seen that the Treaty of Lisbon solves the question in favor of 
the CJEU. Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon clarified the boundaries of the competence and the 
sources of the competence. The answer, however, depends upon the phrasing of the question. 
If the question is phrased as ultra vires question, the Treaties provides an answer. According to 
the Treaties, the source of the competence is the Member States, but the interpretation of the 
competence is within the Court’s competence.326 The borders of the competence are determined 
mainly in the Treaty amending and ratification process.327 Then again, if the question is phrased 
as concerning the boundaries of the attributed competence, such as whether the Member States 
have attributed certain powers to the Union, the answer is opposite. The Member States can 
define their own actions and retrospectively state what the action included. As long as the 
competence is not determined exhaustively, the debate continues. It is not expected that the 
Union and Member States would fully agree with all the details in the boundaries of the Union 
competence. This concerns especially open-ended provisions – such as the flexibility clause.  
In conclusion, the question of whom holds the authority to determine the boundaries of the 
competence have significance in the context of the establishment of the EMF. The Member 
States’ role in the determination of the boundaries of the competence means that the 
constitutional views of Member States on the issue have impact on the establishment of the 
EMF. The application of the flexibility clause requires the unanimity of the Council, and, 
therefore, it would be impossible to take a measure that national authorities oppose heavily. A 
Member State that opposes the establishment of the EMF on the basis of its constitution, would 
preclude the unanimity. The answer to the question whether the EU has competence to establish 
EMF without a Treaty amendment will vary depending on the responder. For example, Finland 
and Germany, which both have stated their authority to determine the boundaries of the 
conferred competence328, would potentially deny the competence to establish the EMF through 
secondary law. 
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5.3 Sovereignty and economic policy 
The Member States’ sovereignty is a basic principle in the area of economic policy. This applies 
both EU and national constitutional law.329 Under the Member States’ constitutions, the national 
governments have the highest budgetary powers. The establishment of the EMF may breach 
this principle, and, therefore, the issue must be examined. If the Member States read the EMF 
limiting their sovereignty in a manner which is prohibited in their constitution, the Member 
States are not willing to agree on the establishment of the EMF. This sub-chapter examines the 
economic sovereignty in the financial assistance regime, changes on the sovereignty connected 
to the establishment of the EMF and Germany and Finland as examples. 
The Member States do not hold full competence in the current system. It has been argued that 
Pringle ruling and the Amendment to Article 136 TFEU have made it explicit that the 
beneficiary states of financial assistance must approve that reduction of sovereignty is the price 
of the assistance.330 Arguably, the Member States have transferred some of their sovereignty 
under the financial crisis to the financial assistance mechanisms.331  The strict conditionality 
and austerity requirements have influenced on the sovereignty of the Member States receiving 
financial support. The fiscal powers in the beneficiary states have shifted to the institution that 
provides the assistance, such as the ESM. The providing parties, including other Member States 
but also International Monetary Fund (IMF), have decided the loan terms. Also, the EU 
institutions have received some of the economic authority due to the role of these institutions 
in the ESM and deciding the conditions of the financial assistance.332 The terms have required 
from the receiving parties’ austerity economic policy. In a sense, the democratically elected and 
electorally accountable national parliaments no longer had sovereignty to decide in the 
economic matters.333 However, the financial assistance is based on intergovernmental Treaty 
that the sovereign States have participated. The participating Member States have, therefore, 
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already delegated its’ sovereign powers to the ESM. Therefore, the current situation and 
existence of the ESM already limit the sovereignty in the field of economic policy. 
The establishment of the EMF as proposed would have effect on the economic sovereignty of 
Member States. The most important changes proposed are directed to the decision-making 
process. In the ESM, the decision of granting financial assistance is made unanimous. 
Therefore, the Member States must mutually agree to the financial assistance package.334 The 
proposed EMF would change the number of votes needed to financial support. The Commission 
propose the reinforced qualified majority of 85 percent of the votes when deciding on granting 
of financial assistance or disbursements. 335 This would remove the veto right from some 
Member States.336 
The establishment of the EMF would change the position of national parliaments and, therefore, 
effect on the sovereignty of the Member States. In the decision-making process of the ESM, the 
national parliaments can agree with the Minister of Finance whether he or she needs to agree 
with the use of the ESM and granting financial assistance. As the decision-making process of 
the ESM requires unanimity, the opinion of the Minister of Finance has had an effect. In the 
EMF decision-making, this is not the case. The qualified majority voting leads to the situation 
where the national parliament, except from German, France and Italy due to their big size, 
cannot rely on the veto. 
It is possible, that the establishment of the EMF is legitimate under the Union law, but not under 
the German constitution, the Basic Law. The principle of democracy and the constitutional 
identity of Germany are the two most important features in the issue. Under the principle of 
democracy, Germany is a democratic and social federal state. These two features, democratic 
and social federal state, form a basis for the interpretation of other constitutional provisions. 
Therefore, these two constitutional principles form the basis of the constitutional identity of 
Germany.337 Under the Basic Law, concerning the integration of the EU, the amendments to 
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the constitution that effect on the constitutional identity, are prohibited.338 The changes to the 
EU that effect to the constitutional identity are, also, precluded.339 The Bundestag and German 
government are bound to protect the principle of democracy and the constitutional identity of 
Germany in the EU integration.340  
The German Constitutional Court has claimed that the constitutional identity of Germany 
differs from the notion of constitutional identity defined in the article 4(2) TEU.341 The 
difference consists not only from the difference in scope between the article 4(2) TEU and 
constitutional identity of Germany, but also in the way these notions are applied. The 
constitutional identity in the Union context includes discretion, whereas the constitutional 
identity of Germany cannot include balancing exercise.342 
In the current system, the German Bundestag discusses, and must agree, prior to the ESM 
decisions which concern the overall budgetary responsibility of Germany. The overall 
budgetary responsibility includes granting the financial assistance, conditions for the assistance, 
and changing the authorized capital or the lending volume.343 Therefore, every time the ESM 
is used, the German Bundestag has approved the usage. As the establishment of the EMF would 
transfer the mechanism into Union legal framework, it is not straightforward whether the 
Bundestag can retain this procedure in the context of the EMF. Notably, Germany still has the 
veto right due to its size. 
The Constitutional Court of Germany has tested the boundaries of the Bundestag’s budget 
sovereignty and the notion of constitutional identity in its case law. It has ruled that the 
Bundestag cannot transfer budgetary responsibility to other authorities as the financial effects 
of the agreed budgetary matters must be apparent beforehand.344 Also, it has held that the 
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fundamental choices in the fiscal matters should remain under the control of the people’s 
representative body. This is because of the principle of democracy, and, therefore, the 
constitutional identity of Germany, enshrined by the fundamental law.345 The Constitutional 
Court has claimed that it has duty to examine the Union actions in the perspective of the 
constitutional identity.346 The Constitutional Court has ruled that the ESM does not infringe 
constitutional identity because of the limited financial liability for Germany.347 It is not 
straightforward whether the Federal Constitutional Court would come into the same conclusion 
regarding the EMF.  
In Finland, the constitutional debate relevant to the establishment of the EMF have focused on 
the parliament’s budgetary powers. Under the Constitution of Finland, the Finnish Parliament 
holds the highest budgetary powers.348 There have been concerns that the change of the voting 
rules is problematic for the parliament’s budget sovereignty.349 As the ESM requires unanimity 
in decisions concerning granting of financial assistance, Finland has influence. However, as the 
EMF is proposed to change the decision-making procedure, Finland, as small Member State, 
cannot have effect on the decisions in such straightforward manner. 
If the EMF hindered the parliament’s role, the EMF would most likely breach the Finnish 
Constitution. Constitutional Law Committee of Finnish Parliament has given a statement on the 
issue. The Committee stated that deciding national budgets is a central part of parliamentarian 
democracy. Therefore, the budgetary sovereignty must be protected.350 Also, the Committee 
has noted that financial support should be seen unity. Important aspects for the evaluation are 
the amount of liabilities, the risk that the liabilities default, parliament’s participation in the 
decision-making and the possible impact on the state’s responsibilities under the 
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Constitution.351 Also, the Committee has, repeatedly, stated that the EMU should be developed 
within the framework of the Treaties.352 Therefore, when asked to Finland, the answer to the 
question whether the Constitution of Finland precludes establishing the EMF as proposed, may 
be positive. 
Nevertheless, opposite arguments for the effects of the establishment of the EMF to the 
sovereignty can be claimed. The EMF may be understood as adding the sovereignty. The 
desirability of the EMF depends on the determination of what is seen as “the inside” and “the 
outside”. In a sense, the involvement of the IMF in financial support programmes can be seen 
the reduction of sovereignty.353 The establishment of the EMF would add the sovereignty of the 
EU when the involvement of the IMF in rescue packages is ruled out. The Commission’s 
proposal represents the will to detach extraneous interference. The establishment of the EMF 
would change the decision-making to fully European without the involvement of the IMF. 
Regardless of the exclusion of international involvement, the national perspective to the 
sovereignty issue has significance. The international perspective does not remove the need for 
the establishment of the EMF to meet the requirements of the national constitutions of Member 
States. To conclude this sub-chapter, the EMF, as proposed, would change the decision-making 
of the decisions about granting financial assistance. This weakens the ability of small Member 
States, such as Finland to effect on the decisions. To big Member States, such as Germany, this 
is not that significant change, as they still can veto decisions. However, there are also other 
constitutional obstacles to the establishment of the EMF that concern especially Germany. The 
notion of constitutional identity is the main concern related to the economic sovereignty of 
Germany in the establishment of the EMF. The constitutional identity of Germany requires that 
Bundestag remains in control of economic decisions. On this account, the establishment of the 
EMF as proposed is controversial. 
To sum up this chapter, it is possible that the establishment of the EMF is under the Union law, 
but in breach of Member States’ constitutions. This chapter examined the role of the 
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constitutions of Member States in regard to the establishment of the EMF. The most important 
constitutional features in the issue relate to the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz and the 
economic sovereignty of the Member States. Some of the Member States have seen that they 
hold the authority to determine the boundaries of the Union competence due to their national 
constitutional law and the principle of conferral in the constitutional law of the EU. As the 
Member States interpret that they hold the authority, they could review the establishment of the 
EMF in this regard. In addition, the Member States’ constitutions take a view on the economic 
sovereignty of Member States’ parliaments that may preclude their willingness to agree on the 
establishment of the EMF. These features are significant not only ex post judicial reviews 
through CJEU and national courts, but also in the time of the adoption of the measure. This is 
because of the procedural requirements of the flexibility clause. The application of the 
flexibility clause requires the unanimity of the Council, and the Council representatives are not 
likely to agree on issues that are in breach of their national constitutions. 
6 CONCLUSIONS  
The financial crisis revealed the need for financial assistance mechanism in the euro area. The 
regime has evolved and the current stability mechanism providing financial assistance to the 
euro area Member States, the ESM, is more structured than the early financial assistance 
arrangements. The incorporation of the ESM into the Union legal framework has been under 
debate for over a year. The Union authorities have clearly stated that the transfer is desired, and, 
according to these authorities, the development of the EU and the EMU requires it. The 
Commission gave its proposal for a Council Regulation on the issue 6 December 2017 and the 
legislative process remains open in the time of writing. The Commission suggests the 
establishment of the EMF through secondary law through application of the flexibility clause. 
However, there has been concerns related to the proposed form of the establishment. 
The focus of the thesis has been on the establishment of the EMF and the proposed legal basis 
of it. The research question of the thesis, whether the current flexibility clause, Article 352 
TFEU can serve as legal basis for the establishment of the EMF, is sought to answer through 
analysing the context of the proposed EMF, including the institutional changes proposed and 
the constitutional features of the Union and Member States. The thesis has examined possible 
legal problems for the flexibility clause to serve as legal basis for the establishment of the EMF. 
The approach to the research question is constitutional: On the one hand, the thesis examines 
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the EU constitution and possible problems arising from it to the establishment of the EMF as 
proposed. On the other hand, the issue is approached through the constitutional laws of Member 
States. 
To sum up, the thesis has examined the regime of the financial assistance mechanisms, the EU’s 
constitution, the wording of the article 352 TFEU and Member States’ constitutional features. 
The main findings of the thesis are related to these perspectives. The findings of the study, as 
reviewed next one by one, include different features that effect on the establishment of the EMF. 
The findings consist on individual factors that may prevent the application of the flexibility 
clause in the establishment of the EMF. 
The examination of the financial assistance regime, and especially the differences between the 
ESM and EMF, reveals that the proposed EMF is in many ways equivalent with the ESM. 
However, there are also distinctions. These distinctions include changes to the decision-making 
process. The change to reinforced qualified majority instead of unanimity in the decisions 
concerning the granting of financial assistance may occur problematic to some Member States.  
As found in the evaluation of the constitutional features of the EU, these features affect the 
application of the flexibility clause for the establishment of the EMF. These effects culminate 
in the question of competence. It is possible that the Union does not have competence to 
establish the EMF as proposed. The most important feature in the evaluation of the boundaries 
of the competence in regards the establishment of the EMF is the principle of conferral, which 
stipulates that the Union only has the competence that the Member States have conferred to it. 
This applies as well to the flexibility clause. The thesis founds that as the Union competence is 
divided into categories based on the Union’s competence to act in certain policy fields, the 
categorization of the EMF is necessary. The category of competence informs whether the Union 
can act in that specific policy area under which the establishment of the EMF falls within. The 
EMF falls within the economic policy, and it is not straightforward that the Union holds the 
needed competence in that policy field. In the area of economic policy, the Member States 
coordinate their economic policies. Also, the principle of subsidiarity affects the establishment 
of the EMF as it is a constitutional principle of the Union and requirement of the application of 
the flexibility clause. However, it is not straightforward whether the principle of subsidiarity 
requires the comparison of the proposed action and the current stability mechanism, or whether 
it simply requires the comparison of the current mechanism into national solutions.  
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The study finds that after the changed phrasing of the flexibility clause the actual recourse to 
the clause has been minor. Therefore, the application of the flexibility clause for the 
establishment of the EMF would, in a way, be change of course. Also, the thesis founds that the 
conditions set by the flexibility clause are not all easily met in the establishment of the EMF. 
These conditions are laid in article 352 TFEU. The flexibility clause itself, under linguistic 
interpretation, limits the application, and these limitations may reveal problems to the 
application in the establishment of the EMF. The flexibility clause’s wording can be understood 
as a test for the application of the clause. Under these conditions, the Treaties have not provided 
the necessary powers to take the measure, the measure must be within the framework of the 
policies of the Union and the measure is necessary to attain one of the objectives of the Union 
determined in the Treaties. The most problematic issues relate to the second and third 
conditions. 
According to the findings of the thesis the problems related to the second condition of the 
flexibility clause may be that severe that they exclude the application of the clause for the 
establishment of the EMF. The problems in the fulfilment of the second condition, that the 
measure must be within the framework of the Union policies, relates to the Court’s case law 
and the requirements found in the case law. Under the case law, the application of the flexibility 
clause in a manner that would widen the general framework of the Treaties is excluded. The 
proposed regulation is not necessarily within the framework of the Union policies as the EMF 
would be binding and under economic policy area, under which only Member States coordinate 
their economic policies. Also, the establishment of the EMF would possibly change the general 
Union framework as it establishes new Union agency that has constitutionally a significant role. 
The thesis finds that there are some problems in the issue related to the third condition of the 
flexibility clause as well. As for fulfilment of the third condition, that and the measure is 
necessary to attain one of the objectives of the Union determined in the Treaties, it is not 
straightforward whether the EMF’s objective, financial stability, is a Union objective under the 
Treaties. The Treaties do not state it as objective. Financial stability can be Union objective if 
it is implied in the general objectives of the Union. Financial stability is deeply interconnected 
with the objectives, but it is not straightforward whether it is an objective. Besides the financial 
stability being objective, the third condition requires necessity. The existence of functioning 
ESM may mean that it is not necessary to establish EMF. The relevant question is rather whether 
the transfer to the Union legal system is necessary than whether the financial assistance 
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mechanism is necessary at all. The necessity of the transfer is not straightforward, either. It is 
not an easy task to measure whether the financial stability is not sufficiently attained. There 
have not been claims of errors in the functioning of the ESM. As the EMF would be 
significantly similar with the ESM and there would not be changes to the system, it is not 
straightforward that the Union action would add new value on the regime. 
In addition, the thesis finds that the Member States’ constitutional considerations may pose 
problems to the establishment of the EMF. As the justification of the Union competence comes 
from the Member States’ constitutions, the statements of constitutional actors have a significant 
role in the determination whether the establishment of the EMF would be under the conferred 
powers. The practical significance relates, also, to the procedural requirement in the flexibility 
clause. The application of the flexibility clause requires that the Council is unanimous. 
Therefore, all Council representatives from all Member States must agree on taking the 
measure. The problems relate to the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz and sovereignty in the 
area of economic policy. Under the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz the self-conferral of the 
Union is prohibited and the Member States’ authorities have claimed that they hold authority 
to determine the boundaries of the competence they have attributed. The constitutions of 
Finland and Germany are used as examples. As for Germany, the problematics for the 
establishment of the EMF through applying the flexibility clause relates to the constitutional 
identity of Germany, whereas for Finland the same problematics are phrased into concerns of 
retaining the parliament’s budgetary sovereignty. As the examples used in the thesis are limited 
mainly to Germany and Finland, and the other Member States are left outside of the 
examination, the findings reflect the constitutions of these two Member States. Other 
constitutional features may be found when different Member States are studied.  
The overall conclusion of the thesis is that the application of the flexibility clause for the 
establishment of the EMF is not problem-free. The answer to the research question, whether 
the article 352 TFEU can serve as legal basis for the establishment of the EMF, is negative in 
the light of the findings in this study. As the thesis recognizes several obstacles to the 
application of the flexibility clause in the establishment of the EMF, it is not likely that the 
EMF is established prior overcoming these obstacles. However, it must be noticed that the 
different problems related to the application of the clause have different importance depending 
on the point of view. 
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Some of these possible obstacles for the application of the flexibility clause in the establishment 
of the EMF found in the thesis can be more easily overcome than others. This depends partly 
on the significance of the obstacle. Fundamental and constitutional problems are more difficult 
to overcome than problems posed by technical aspects. However, the technical aspects often 
relate to the more significant aspects. For example, the decision-making in the proposed EMF 
and the principle of sovereignty of the Member States are related. The voting rules of the 
proposed EMF would possibly hinder the sovereignty of Member States. It is easier to change 
the voting rules than the constitutional principle of the sovereignty.  
The legislative procedure of the proposal is unfinished. The next steps in the process is the 
discussion and the possible establishment of the Council regulation. As examined, it is not 
straightforward that the Council can accomplish unanimity in the issue. If the unanimity is 
accomplished, and the Council adapts the measure, the next step is the approval by the European 
Parliament. These next steps are excepted in mid-2019. 
The study is the limited number of the Member States’ constitutions evaluated. The examples 
used in the thesis, the constitutions of Finland and Germany, does not reflect the constitutions 
of all Member States. By the evaluation of other Member States and their constitutions could 
provide additional information for the constitutional requirements rising from national 
constitutions. Also, the other examples could offer more in-depth knowledge for the issue.  
The thesis leaves some questions unanswered. The most important questions for the future 
relate to the need for the detailed analysis of the necessity of the establishment of the EMF. As 
the thesis only named the possible obstacles of the application of the flexibility clause, the 
detailed analysis could provide more information about the actual need for the EMF. Firstly, 
the evaluation of the applicability of the flexibility clause in this matter requires the economic 
analysis of the state of financial stability and the crisis preparedness of the current mechanism 
compared with the proposed EMF. Secondly, the evaluation of the necessity of the EMF 
compared with the ESM needs to go more in detail. This evaluation could, among other things, 
study the credibility of the current system. If there are lacks in the credibility, the EMF, provided 
that it improves the credibility, could prove itself as necessary.  
Some of the open questions that remain open relate to the status of the proposal as the opening 
of the legislative process. The possible outcome in the debate has importance broadly and some 
of the open questions get answered during the debate. The future will show whether the debate 
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leads to the more specific determination of the boundaries of the Union competence. As the 
thesis has been shown, the boundaries of the Union competence are vague especially in the area 
of economic policy. This interconnects with the determination of the status of the financial 
stability among the Union objectives. It is possible that during the debate about the 
establishment of the EMF these boundaries get clearer in context of the financial stability. Also, 
the debate may have implications for the determination of the flexibility clause’s role in the 
future. As the article 352 TFEU has been applied only for minor legislative acts, the 
establishment of the EMF as proposed would be, in a way, change of course. The possible 
establishment of the EMF by applying the flexibility clause directs the future applications of 
the flexibility clause. The possible establishment of the EMF would, also, guide the future 
integration of the EMU. The possible application of the flexibility clause and the future case 
law testing the legality of the application of the flexibility clause in the matter determine the 
roles of the financial stability and the economic policy in the post-financial crisis framework. 
